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Not Interaction but Melding-The
"Russian Dressing" Theory of
Emotions: An Explanation of the
Phenomenology of Emotions and
Rationality with Suggested
Related Maxims for Judges and
Other Legal Decision Makers
Peter Brandon Bayer*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Even after centuries of contrary philosophy and psychology, many
commentators, jurisprudes, and law makers insist that emotions have no
legitimate place in most legal decision making. This recalcitrance, of
course, is misplaced in light of the powerful body of theory explaining
that without emotions, decisions, including matters of law and policy,
simply cannot be made.' Judges, along with all societal actors, must
disabuse themselves of the fallacious belief that emotions obstruct or
obscure reason in all endeavors, particularly morality, law, and justice.
The project of truly apprehending emotions, however, requires more
than appreciating that they play a crucial role in decision making.
Additionally, we must shun the heuristic and faulty premise that an
individual's ascription of meaning regarding a particular situation
involves the weighing or parsing of emotions and rational contemplation

* Hamilton College (B.A., 1975); New York University (J.D., 1988); Harvard University
(LL.M., 1992). I wish to thank my colleagues, Professor John L. Hill and Dean Daniel
Morrissey, for their help and thoughtful comments.
1. See infra Part II.
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as though one was analyzing a financial statement by simultaneously
contrasting two columns of data. Rather, the human capacity to discern
meaning arises not simply from the consideration of emotions with
reason nor even from their intertwining like vines of ivy around a pole.
Emotions and rationality do not simply work together; they meld into a
new, unique entity that we designate as "meaning." It is the systemic
fusing of emotions and reason that comprises "meaning," thus underscoring the indispensability of emotions in projects such as law making and
legal analysis.2
This Article first briefly recounts the psychology and philosophy of
emotions within a framework of modern systems theory to explain the
dynamic of how people and groups must use emotions to ascribe meaning
and significance to their lives. Second, and more importantly, this
Article explains that the most progressive theorists still heuristically
separate emotions and rationality. That is, even some of the best minds
writing on emotions have trouble conceptualizing a systemic thought
process of coalescing emotion and reason yielding modes of behavior, a
matrix of moral values and other indices of meaning.
The primary purpose, then, is to explicate that the process through
which individuals interpret-ascribe significance to objects and
events-actually melds emotions and reason to the point where, within
the interpretive schema, the two cannot be separated but, rather, emerge
as meaning upon which action is taken. This Article offers a construct,
somewhat humorously denoted the "Russian Dressing" metaphor, to help
enable judges and other social actors to envision the decision making
process not as the layering of emotions and rationality, but as a systemic
flow of emotions and reason that unite into a singular amalgam-something unique and new--of which neither the former nor the
latter masters the other.3
Before describing the actuality of the emotional-rational melding, it is
useful to ask: Does it really matter? Does it make a difference whether
individuals in general, and legal decision makers such as judges in
particular, truly understand that emotions are indispensable to the
reasoning process and, equally essentially, that emotions inextricably
merge with reason in order to produce decisions? The answer indisputably is "yes."
First, the quest for knowledge often involves attempting to understand
how people act-why they do what they do. Any account that provides

2. For the purposes of this Article, the concepts of "rationality" and "reason" will be
used synonymously.
3. See infra Part II.H.2. The Article concludes with suggested maxims regarding the
emotional-rational process and legal decision making.
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a better-a more accurate or more lucid-description of a profound
human enterprise such as ascribing meaning to objects, ideas, and
events helps to explain the human condition. Investigations into
ontology, epistemology, politics, morality, and other overarching
constructs of existence must raise, inter alia, the question of how and
when emotions have and should have a role in human life. To offer
possible resolutions of these difficult questions we surely must try to
understand what emotions are and how they work.
More particularly, our culture of law has promoted and continues to
promote outrageous misconceptions regarding the connection between
emotions and both the legal system and legal decision makers, particularly judges. "The aversion to granting emotion a legitimate place in the
public policy process grows out of a long western moral tradition in
which moralists have viewed emotions as dangerous or irrelevant."4
Plato, for instance, firmly believed that emotions obstruct or obscure
each person's "true self," thus distorting deliberation and frustrating
attainment of reason, which is how the true self is identified.' "Plato
repudiated emotion and appetite as corrupting influences, insisting that
correct practical judgments are reached only by encouraging the intellect
to go off 'itself by itself,' free from their influences as far as possible."6
Indeed, the historical persistence of the debased position of emotions is
due in large part to the Platonic argument that emotions "subvert
rationality and distort truth" and the Stoics' belief that "emotions [are]
diseases of the soul, to be cured by proper thinking."'
It is Immanuel Kant, of course, who exemplifies the philosopher's
quest to rid humanity of emotions in the belief that through pure

4. D. Don Welch, Ruling With The Heart: Emotion-Based Public Policy, 6 S. CAL.
INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 55, 63 (1997).
5. See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE 76 (Oxford 1990). Similarly,
as one scholar explained, the popular separation of reason and passion is traceable to
Plato's Phaedo in which Socrates taught that, "some of the elements of our inner life,
namely, the passions and desires, are not truly parts of ourselves at all; what is to be
identified with the true self is the reason that says yes or no to them." TERRENCE
PENELHUM, Hume's Moral Philosophy, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HUME, at 122-23

(1993).
6.
7.

NUSSBAUM, supra note 5, at 76.
KEITH OATLEY, BEST LAID SCHEMES-THE

PSYCHOLOGY OF

EMOTIONS

131

(Cambridge Univ. Press 1992); accord., e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE 56-57
(Beacon Press 1995). Professor Nussbaum believes that Plato and the Stoics did not see
emotions as detached from judgment. "The problem, however, is that the judgements are
false. They are false because they ascribe a very high value to external persons and events
that are not fully controlled by the person's virtue or rational will. They are acknowledg-

ments, then, of the person's own incompleteness and vulnerability." Id. at 56.
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As Professor Hill

Kant argued that human action could only be truly autonomous when
it was performed according to the dictates of reason unfettered by
"heteronomous" influences such as desires and inclinations. According
to Kant, reason must be free from the bondage of will in order for the
person to attain genuine autonomy.9

The quest to expunge or to minimize the role of emotions in human
affairs, particularly regarding law, is no artifact of bygone centuries. To
the contrary, the crusade to embrace reason without emotion has excited
many contemporary theorists of law and society. Indeed, one may look
to three leading contemporary jurisprudes who espouse theories of
pristine rationality to inform law and legal decision making. In his
work, The PartialConstitution, noted philosopher Cass Sunstein urged
that constitutional issues have singularly correct answers and that
reason, rather than emotions, sentiments, power, or coercion will lead to
a collective, absolute understanding of the Constitution.10 Likewise,
Owen Fiss, another theorist of deservedly high regard, yearns for an
"entirely rationalistic" judicial process eschewing emotions."

8. See generally IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 511-15 (F. Max Muller
trans., 2d ed. 1907); IMMANUEL KANT, Groundingfor the Metaphysics of Morals, in ETHICAL
PHILOSOPHY 49-62 (James W. Ellington trans., 1983).
9. John L. Hill, Exploitation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 631, 674-75 (1994). Similarly,
Sabini and Silver synopsized Kant's philosophy thus: "The domain of the moral is the
domain of the will expressed in action; it is the domain of that for which we are
responsible. Emotions are beyond the will, and for this reason have no intrinsic moral
value." John Sabini & Maury Silver, Emotions, Responsibilityand Character,in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER AND THE EMOTIONS-NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 165
(Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987); see also, e.g., NUSSBAUM, supra note 5, at 76; Daniel J.
Morrissey, Moral Truth and the Law: A New Look at an Old Link, 47 SMU L. REV. 61, 6869 (1993) (contrasting Kant and Hume); Dan M. Kahan & Martha Nussbaum, Two
Conceptions of Emotion in CriminalLaw, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 299 n.121 (1996).
Indeed, Kant authored his emphatic denouncement of emotions as impediments to ethical
clarity directly in response to David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature celebrating
passions as the route to meaning in human life. In a notable tribute, Kant said Hume's
work had "woken me from my dogmatic slumbers." Morrissey, supra note 9, at 68 n.42;
ANTHONY FLEW, PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 49 (1980).
10. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 17-39, 93-122 (Harvard Univ. Press
1993); see also, e.g., Robin L. West, The Constitution of Reasons, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1409
(1994) (criticizing Sunstein's belief in constitutional reasoning absent emotions).
11.

Owen M. Fiss, Reason in All Its Splendor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 789, 789, 800-04

(1990). Professor Gewirtz authored a strong rebuke of Professor Fiss' disavowal of
emotions, noting that Fiss misconceived the emotional-rational process. See Paul Gewirtz,
On "IKnow It When I See It," 105 YALE L.J. 1023, 1035-36 nn.42-44 (1996).
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Few modern minds have had the impact of John Rawls whose work,
A Theory of Justice, ranks among the most important of twentieth
century legal philosophy. In a much discussed section, Rawls proposed
the "original position" in which disembodied entities with no knowledge
of what their lives, conditions, or statuses will be on earth, must
determine what is or is not just before commencing their earthly
existence. Rawls imagined that within the original position, "[t]he
principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. Since all are
similarly situated and no one is able to design principles to favor his
particular condition, the principles of justice are the result of a fair
agreement or bargain. " " According to Rawls, the hallmark of the
original position is that all occupants therein are "rational and mutually
disinterested." s Rawls, too, looks for a jurisprudence of rationality
without emotion. 4
The prejudice against emotions arises in large part because we feel
emotions and we assess the appropriateness of our reasoning process by
the emotions attendant to that process.' 5 Because emotions comprise
our feelings, we are apt to blame the emotions for our mistakes rather
than understand that our errors are the results of an imperfect process
in which reasoning too is at fault. The heuristic was well summarized
by Professor Pillsbury as "the myth of dispassion":
The predominate culture of the law promotes formal, deliberative, and
dispassionate decision making. Its modern ideal is a complete
rationalistic rule structure which determines results in an objective,
i.e., impersonal fashion .... The culture of modern law discourages

informal, intuitive, personal or passionate decision making ....
Because courts view the law as fundamentally dispassionate ...
courts have often concluded that lack of emotion is an essential
attribute of justice.'

12.

JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12 (1971).

13. Id. at 13.
14. Many commentators have challenged Rawls' position. Dean Welch, for example,
offered a convincing reproach noting that, by Rawls' own admission, the "original position"
model cannot handle the very type of "hard cases" that, Rawls says, "distract our moral
perception by leading us to think of people distant from us whose fate arouses pity and
anxiety." Welch, supra note 4, at 65 (quoting John Rawls, A Kantian Concept of Equality,
96 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 96 (1975)). However, as Dean Welch accented, these hard cases are
precisely what law is designed to manage; if law resolves these disputes imperfectly, there
is no more fair nor more perfect exemplar, although, certainly, discrete legal decisions,
procedures, and instrumentalities may be unfair and subject to reformation. Id. at 65-66.
15. See infra Parts ILA, B, G, H, J.
16. Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal
Punishment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 655, 665-66 (1989) (footnotes omitted).
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The delusion of emotionless law is embodied in the idealized judge, as
Professor Bandes noted in her powerful article on emotions:
Whereas the juror and the attorney receive constant reminders that
their perspectives are partial, the judge is encouraged by every
trapping of the judicial role to believe that his own perspective is truly
universal-a grave danger indeed ....
[Tihe judge's claim to speak in a universal voice goes hand-in-hand
with his claim to have moved beyond individual emotions and morals
into the emotionless realm of the rule of law ....
This mentality... privileges emotions that the judge doesn't think
of as "emotional" (such as the zeal to prosecute and the desire for
revenge).17
Indeed, while not without the occasional notable exception, judicial
opinions habitually profess a Platonic-Kantian credo that emotions have
no legitimate place in legal decision making. Sixty years ago the Court
admonished that interpretation of due process must be performed by a
judiciary "free of prejudice, passion, [and] excitement." 8 With regard
to the more specific due process issue of capital punishment, Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor urged that imposition of the death penalty must
reflect a "reasoned moral response ... and not an emotional re-

sponse." 9 On the equally contentious issue of abortion, the Court
rashly opined, "Our task, of course, is to resolve the issue by constitutional measurement, free of emotion and of predilection." 0
This mistaken antagonism towards emotions--"the myth of dispassion"--"rests on two fictions: (1) that emotion necessarily leads to

17. Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 361, 377-78 (1996) (footnote omitted).
18. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236-37 (1940).
19. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring); accord
Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 508 (1987). Fifteen years earlier, the contemplative and
often astute Justice Potter Stewart averred, "[Alny decision to impose the death sentence
[must] be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice and emotion." Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 311 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
20. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973); see also Saffie v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 493,
495 (1990) (allowing juries to consider sympathy threatens fairness); DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202-03 (1989) (holding government
entity not liable for failing to take steps likely to have prevented abusive father from
severely beating his four-year-old son).
However, courts have embraced emotions when it pleases them. See, e.g., Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (noting death penalty may reflect community's "moral
outrage"); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 948-51 (1983) (holding judge may express
outrage at defendant's conduct when imposing death sentence).
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injustice, and (2) that a just decision maker is necessarily a dispassionate one."21
Because human beings are incapable of ascribing meaning and
significance without recourse to emotions-thus legal decision making
simply cannot be performed absent emotion-any theory allowing legal
decision makers to imagine the contrary profoundly distorts the reality
of the process, thereby defying the legitimacy of any decision rendered
pursuant to that fallacy or, perhaps better put, fantasy. One may
question whether a system such as the judiciary is tenable and
legitimate if its dons are unable or unwilling to acknowledge forthrightly
to themselves, much less to others, the actual dynamic of their deliberative process. If judges do not appreciate the verity of emotions as
integral to their judgments, we cannot be sure that their decisions truly
reflect what they intended to decide or, more importantly, what they
would have decided had they been free of self-deception.22
Convincing judges that they do and must utilize emotions will strip
them of the subterfuge-the untoward luxury-of ascribing their
decisions exclusively to extra-human and, more significantly, extrapersonal constructs such as precedent, text, purportedly neutral
rationality, and generic common sense. This is not to imply, of course,
that most judges are ignorant of or wholly insensitive to the decades of
jurisprudence demonstrating the political nature of lawmaking and
judging. Many judges consider themselves to be sophisticated "legal
realists." Still, there remains a uniquely stubborn reluctance to
acknowledge, much less embrace, the actuality that judicial decisions-indeed all lawmaking-is possible only because of the emotions
of the decision makers.
Judges who fully appreciate not only the purported interplay, but
indeed the unavoidable blending of emotions and reason, will be better
able to render the opinions they truly believe are appropriate under law.
The fact that judges' decisions trigger within them and within others
certain emotional responses will no longer be understood as a warning
that their rulings are illicit. Rather, they will willingly contemplate
their emotional responses-they will embrace the emotional-rational
melding as inherent to the discovery of thorough meaning and will

21.

Pillsbury, supra note 16, at 666.

22. Professor Gewirtz provided a useful example of how the "myth of dispassion" might
foster consequences unforeseen and unwanted by the decision maker: "I believe legal
regulators have not adequately appreciated that attempting to suppress pornography may
enhance its allure, since pornography's appeal probably rests in part on its being treated
as taboo." Gewirtz, supra note 11, at 1033 n.29.
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pursue the range of emotions to help them devise their most appropriate
meanings arising from the discrete legal controversies.
No longer apprehensive, embarrassed, and confounded by emotions,
judges should judge more perfectly, more thoroughly, and engage in the
very difficult project of challenging their own predispositions more
successfully. They will appreciate more fully that the dominant or
prevailing standards are not necessarily correct because they render the
triumph of reason over passion. Rather, judges will know that just
below the seemingly emotionless facade are the accepted, often
unspoken, and, because of their familiarity, unacknowledged emotions
of status quo arguments. These judges will understand that challenges
to the status quo must come from the introduction of new arguments,
and thus, the introduction of different, perhaps unfamiliar and,
therefore, uncomfortable emotions. As a result, the formation of legal
arguments will be viewed, as they should be, as a clash of emotional
reasoning. The status quo perhaps no longer will carry so easily the
pretense of transcendence."

II. THE EMOTIONAL PROCESS-A GENERAL DEFINITION OF EMOTIONS,
THEIR PURPOSES, AND THEIR MELDING WITH RATIONALITY

A.

The Definition of Emotions
When first considered, any discussion of emotions, their causes and
effects, seems vexed, for, as one scholar sighed, "Even a cursory foray in
the writings of philosophers, psychologists and neurobiologists reveals

23. See Bandes, supra note 17, at 370, 385, 409; Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories
in School: A Reply to Farber and Sherry, 46 VAND. L. REV. 665, 666-67 (1993); Peter
Margulies, Inclusive and Exclusive Virtues: Approaches to Identity, Merit, andResponsibility in Recent Legal Thought, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 1109, 1126 (1997); Kahan & Nussbaum,
supra note 9, at 296-97.
Ironically, the political and social consequences are not clear. We cannot fully predict
what will transpire if judges truly accept the emotional aspect of decision making as
essential and not obstructive. We may wish that it will encourage judges to be more openminded and humble, leading to fairer decisions. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Aristotle,
Feminism and Needs for Functioning,70 TEX. L. REV. 1019 (1992). Many commentators
believe that the more a judge understands the truth of how and why she renders her
decisions, the more likely it is that she can and will be just. See, e.g., Peter J. Riga, The
Nature of Truth and Dissent, 40 AM. J. JURIS. 71 (1995). However, a judge who belatedly
recognizes the role of emotions may still determine that her pre-existing prejudices and
beliefs are appropriate. Understanding the dynamics of emotions and reason does not
guarantee a particular result. See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 17, at 366-71. At the very
least, nevertheless, both the decision maker and interested observers will more fully know
what given decisions mean and how they were made when the "myth of dispassion" finally
is dispelled.
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the daunting complexity of the study of emotions. There is widespread
agreement2 4on the impossibility of finding a definition for the term
'emotion.'"
The purported impossibility of agreeing on a complete and
irrevocable definition of emotion, like the impossibility of fully defining
most terms, should not and, indeed, has not prevented the unfolding of
a rich and meaningful literature traversing over two thousand years.
Actually, remarkable accord exists among social scientists and philosophers establishing a functional, albeit unavoidably broad, definition.
Profoundly disagreeing with his tutor Plato, Aristotle recognized the
importance of emotions to human intercourse. Aristotle believed that
one cannot understand how to conduct oneself appropriately without the
warnings and triggers attendant to emotions.25 The battle between the
Aristotelean and Platonic positions still rages.2 6
While Aristotle's steadfast rejection of Plato's critique of emotions set
the timbre that would resonate across centuries, a thorough appreciation
of emotions is impossible without crossing two millennia to David Hume,
whose highly regarded and obligingly readable discourse, A Treatise of
Human Nature, originally published in 1739, explored in compelling
depth both the nature of emotions-"passions" as Hume denoted
them-and the interconnections between emotions, rationality, human
nature, and morality. Anticipating modern psychology and physiology,
Hume recognized that the essential function of emotions is to disturb us,
often in pleasant ways, but to agitate nonetheless, requiring us to
ascribe meaning or significance to our own acts and to the acts of others.
Judgments, particularly about our own worth, character, and value, "are
always attended with passions, . . . which diffuses itself over
2 7 the
imagination, and gives an additional force to every related idea."
Hume presaged and, with Aristotle, provides rapport with contemporary psychology's precept that emotions are those "mental disturbance[s]" that let us know something noteworthy or significant is taking
place.28 As explained by psychologist Richard S. Lazarus, a preeminent scholar on the theory of emotions, "[tihe emotion system is in
place in our species to ensure that the truly important things in life,

24. Bandes, supra note 17, at 366 (footnote omitted).
25. See generallyARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (J.A.K. Thomson trans., 1976);
Nussbaum, supra note 23, at 1022; see also Martha Nussbaum, Emotion in the Language
of Judging,70 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 23, 25 (1996); RONALD DE SOUSA, THE RATIONALITY OF
EMOTION 183 (MIT 1987); Sabini & Silver, supra note 9, at 171.

26. See supra notes 4-21 and accompanying text.
27. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, BOOK II 75-76 (Pall S. Ardal ed.,
Fontana/Collins 1972). See generally id. at BOOKS II and BOOKS III.
28. OATLEY, supra note 7, at 46.
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Emotions, then, are

integral to the "adaptational wholeness" of the person; they are the
psychosocio-biological construct that, joined with rationality, convey the
personal meaning of what is happening in our lives, particularly our
social lives. °
The quintessence of emotions is that they provide the cues that we
must stop what we are doing, pay attention, consider what is happening
around us, and adopt a course of response.3 ' Emotions provide their
cues and warning signs when "a psychological tendency is arrested or
when smoothly flowing action is interrupted. The mental disturbance of
this interruption is experienced as an emotion."" We recognize these
mental disturbances by the feelings and sensations they generate; that
is, we perceive emotions or clusters of emotions by their accompanying
physical and psychological manifestations.33
Given the abstractness of the definition of emotions, we might
fruitfully attempt to recognize and understand emotional phenomena by
what Lazarus calls their "core relational themes"--the essential
manifestations commonly associated with the given emotion. 4 For
instance, Lazarus identified "Anger" through the core relational theme
of "A demeaning offense against me and mine." 35 Anxiety is "Facing

uncertain, existential threat."36

29.

Hope is "Fearing the worst but

RICHARD S. LAZARUS, EMOTION AND ADAPTATION 208 (Oxford Univ. Press 1991).

30. Id. at 6-7.
31. As Lazarus noted, "Emotions are organized psychophysiological reactions to news
about ongoing relationships with the environment. 'News' is colloquial for knowledge or
beliefs about the significance for personal well-being of the person-environment
relationship." Id. at 38.
32. OATLEY, supra note 7, at 46 (emphasis added).
33. To illustrate with one very familiar example, we identify the emotion "fear" by a
combination of manifestations such as sudden, excessive perspiring, an empty feeling in
the "pit" of the belly, tense pain in the chest, heavy breathing, and similar sensations that,
in toto, depict the theme that there is something to dread. Aware of this feeling of
dread-this fear-we are prompted to discern its source and to formulate apt responsive
behavior.
34.

A core relational theme is simply the central (hence core) relational harm or
benefit in adaptational encounters that underlies each specific kind of emotion
.... When its implications for well-being are appraised by the person, each
thematic relationship produces an action impulse consistent with the core
relational theme and the emotion that flows from it. [Thus,] ...each emotion has
its own particular core relational theme, appraisal pattern, and action tendency
[unique to each human actor.]
LAZARUS, supra note 29, at 121.
35. Id. at 122, Table 3.4.
36. Id.
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yearning for better."3 1 Various commentators disagree regarding lists
of diverse emotions.38
No commentator boldly claims to draw up a chart of immutable core
relational themes the way one can plot a reliable genetic map. At best,
even an accurate list of core relational themes describes anticipatory
reactions of sufficient frequency to define generally the emotion and the
system in which the emotion plays. Each individual actor comprises a
unique amalgam of physiological and socially learned responses to
combinations of emotions; thus, in that sense, any given actor's response
to emotional stimuli essentially is original. 9 Still, investigation and
experience confirm that responses may be sufficiently similar overall to
permit predictions of acceptable reliability, at least insofar as estimating
how a significant number of people likely will react under specific
conditions.4 °
Similarly, with specific enough knowledge, we may
reliably estimate how a particular actor will respond in a particular
situation. Certainly, neither complex social science nor philosophy of
language and meaning are necessary to confirm what daily living
instructs: We do not live on the cusp of interpretive hopelessness. 1
Nonetheless, explication of core relational themes is particularly
complex because emotions do not usually travel alone. Experience
informs that emotions manifest in clusters although, at any given
moment, one emotion may predominate over others. Multiple emotions
are inevitable because "there are many agendas and thematic facets to
a complex encounter."4 2 Hume recognized that not only multiple
corresponding emotions, but also seemingly contradictory emotions,
regularly arise from a given set of events. Using an example he called
"pity reversed," Hume noted that the observer may feel pity and

37. Id. Additional identified emotions include, but certainly are not limited to, fright,
guilt, shame, sadness, envy, jealousy, disgust, happiness, pride, relief, love, and
compassion.
38. Oatley, for example, posited five basic emotions: happiness, anger, disgust, fear,
and sadness. OATLEY, supra note 7, at 55, 103.
39. See, e.g., FREDERICK L. BATES, SOCIOPOLITICAL ECOLOGY-HUMAN SYSTEMS AND
ECOLOGICAL FIELDS 6-19 (Plenum Press 1997).
40. LAZARUS, supra note 29, at 121.
41. See, e.g., BATES, supra note 39, at 7 (stating the test of any actor's perception of
reality is its success as a predictor of how others will respond to the behavior or the actor);
see also Robin L. West, The LiteraryLawyer, 27 PAC. L. REV. 1187, 1197 (1996); LUDWIG
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 43 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed.
1958); Bruce A. Markell, Truth?, 72 IND. L.J. 1115, 1127 (1997); DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW
AND TRUTH 170 (1996).
42. LAZARUS, supra note 29, at 62; see also HUME, supra note 27, at 43-44 (explaining
one emotion may result in another resulting in another in a pattern or even a circle such
as grief resulting in anger resulting in envy resulting in malice returning to grief).
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compassion for the destitute stranger while simultaneously feeling
happiness that it is the stranger, not the observer, who is poor.43
Indeed, these conflicting emotions generate numerous, often contradictory core relational themes along with numerous, often contrary, estimations of meaning."
B.

The Societal Functions of Emotions

As just described, the amalgam of feelings and sensations that we
classify as one or more discrete emotions help us manage in a world that
we cannot fully understand by enabling us to plan, to understand, and
to react. 45 Consequently, one knows that something is meaningful to
one's life by identifying and pondering attendant emotions. The
informative function was well understood by Hume, who aptly perceived
the passions as integral to self-reflection and meaning.4 In this way,
emotions and their particular congruence with given individuals allow
us both to understand ourselves and to generate "sympathy"-a socially
shared understanding of "the inclinations and sentiments" of other
47
people-with reasoning, "which makes us regard [others'] judgment."

43. HUME, supra note 27, at 122.
44. Hume deftly summarized,
Now as we seldom judge of objects from their intrinsic value, but from our notion
of them from a comparison with other objects; it follows, that accordingly as we
observe a greater or less share of happiness or misery in others, we must take an
estimate of our own, and feel a consequent pain or pleasure. The misery of
another gives us a more lively idea of our happiness, and his happiness of our
misery .... A small object makes a great one appear still greater. A great object
makes a little one appear less.
Id.
45. OATLEY, supra note 7, at 24-25. Psychologists have tried to hone the definition by
distinguishing emotions from other states that seem emotion-like because, like emotions,
they are known to us by physical responses. For instance, "moods" are overdispositions
usually lasting long periods of time, emanating from at first unknown reasons. See, e.g.,
LAZARUS, supra note 29, at 47-49. Similarly, investigators differentiate "states" from
'emotions." Hunger, for instance, is a "state" which drives us to eat.
The singular difference between emotions and emotion-like or emotion-saturated
conditions such as "states," "moods," and "capacities" is that emotions inspire the individual
to reflect deeply, on a conscious or unconscious level, to ascribe meaning and significance
to the mixture of sensations identified as one or more emotions. By contrast, a person may
abide under the influence of a mood, a state, or a capacity either without reflection or by
engaging in what fairly might be called shallow reflection, that is, noting nothing more
than the nature and persistence of the mood, state, or capacity.
46. "Weseldom reflect on what is beautiful or ugly, agreeable or disagreeable, without
an emotion of pleasure or uneasiness . . . ." HUME, supra note 27, at 107.
47. Id. at 72, 76. "Sympathy" requires some workable comprehension of the
perceptions, goals, and motivations of other individuals. 'Sympathy," Hume was quick to
accent, is not synonymous with "compassion," which is valuing the feelings of others. The
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Thus, emotions are necessary to understand others. Indeed, emotions
become even more than the means through which individuals initiate
and contemplate interpersonal interactions, as pivotal as that function
of emotions is. Emotions are the tools with which to define, perceive,
and evaluate morals.48
The Humian-Aristotelian understanding of emotions and morality as
it relates to law has been embraced by modem jurisprudence.49 Given
their manifest importance for human interaction, the extensive legal
It is
commentaries concerning emotions are hardly surprising.
appropriate to accent the passions' indispensability to law by quoting
Professor Martha Nussbaum, perhaps the leading contemporary
jurisprude on emotions, meaning, and morality:
To remove the beliefs about worth on which love, fear, grief, and so on
are based is indeed to remove many sources of pain, but the resulting
life may seem flat and lacking in wonder. And it may also be lacking
in a type of information that is crucial to good ethical and also legal
reasoning; to respond with the pain of compassion at the sight of
another person's suffering is to understand the importance of that
suffering in a way no uncommitted person could possibly do. Without
the information given by such emotions few difficult issues concerning
poverty, or damages, or privacy, or mitigation, could be well addressed.50

C. The Concept of the Actor
Involving as it does morals, the creation of meaning, and human
interactions, a theory of emotions must posit a concept of the actor. As
a general matter, the philosophy and psychology of emotions propounds
rational, choice-making actors who can be self-reflective, who are goal
oriented, and who attempt to understand their environments.51
The rationality of a given actor may be viewed either objectively or
subjectively. One expression of the objective view is that something is
irrational if it is contrary to empirical fact.52 A similar but consider-

latter certainly may arise but is not an inevitable consequence of the congruence of
sympathy and reason. Id. at 76.
48. See infra Part II.F.
49. See generally Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 285-97; Welch, supra note 4, at
68.
50. Martha C. Nussbaum, Skepticism, About PracticalReason in Literature and the
Law, 107 HARv. L. REV. 714, 737-38 (1994) (footnote omitted).
51. See, e.g., LAZARUS, supra note 29, at 90-91, 134-35.
52. This objective rationality is typified by symbolic logic, a process with rules that
allow testing for internal consistency without moral, political, or value judgments. If, for
instance, A > B and B > C, then A > C. A cannot be < C under the rules of logic. To assert
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ably broader and more popular formulation holds that "[r]eason alone
will wrinkle out inconsistencies in our convictions, and the critical use
of reason will expose inconsistency in the views of others.""3 We might
call this formulation the "rules of the game" concept: Certain set rules
are triggered by certain ensuing criteria leading to one or more
acceptable behavioral responses consistent with the philosophy of the
rules of the scenario. This concept clearly is broader than defining
irrationality simply as defiance of empirical reality because the rules or
scenarios may be based in either empiricism or political-moral ideology
defined in the broadest possible sense. 4
Turning from objectivity to subjectivity, rationality may be defined
subjectively, which, as Hume understood, is an iteration in summary
form of the emotional-rational process:
[W]hen we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, we
feel a consequent emotion of aversion or propensity, and are carried to
avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction. It
is also obvious, that this emotion rests not here, but making us cast
our view on every side, comprehends whatever objects are connected
with its original one by the relation of cause and effect. Here then
reasoning takes place to discover this relation; and according as our
reasoning varies, our actions receive a subsequent variation. But it is

evident in this case, that the impulse arises not from reason, but is
only directed by it. It is from the prospect of pain or pleasure that the
aversion or propensity arises towards any object; and these emotions
that object, as they are
extend themselves to the causes and effects of
5
pointed out to us by reason and experience.

that A > B and B > C, yet A < C is irrational because it irrevocably confounds the rules.
Similarly, under an objective definition of rationality we may presume that, with sufficient
knowledge, an observer could explain in a positive, non-normative fashion whether a given
actor selected goals that actually conform with her authentic desires and whether she chose
the most appropriate means either to attain a specific goal or to accommodate a host of
conflicting goals. The actor may have believed that her actions were rational in that they
conformed to the rules of her own game, but the facts reveal to the observer that her
behavior was irrational. A clear example is an actor who shoots herself inthe head in
order to promote good health. Assuming that the actor's sole or overarching goal is good
health, shooting herself is irrational because it breaks the rules-as a physical reality a
bullet in the brain is contrary to remaining healthy.
Many commentators seriously question whether any observer may describe human
behavior absent interpretation based in some part on the observer's personal biases
attendant to the meaning of actions and rules. E.g., BATES, supra note 39, at 6.
53. West, supra note 10, at 1434.
54. For example, racism, with rare exceptions, is morally wrong. See Hill, supra note
9, at 689.
55. HUME, supra note 27, at 155-56 (emphasis added).
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Subjective rationality, then, is the process through which we evaluate
the impulses to action generated by our emotions and decide which
impulses to indulge and, of those, to what extent. 56 We act rationally
by seeking to maximize our pleasure and minimize our pain. Similarly,
subjective rationality is the process through which observers ascribe
meaning or significance to their observations of others. Although,
arguably, an observer may objectively describe an actor's emotionalrational episode and measure whether the actor's resultant behavior is
consistent with the actor's goals, thus rational, the observer must plumb
her own subjective rationality if she cares to ascribe meaning, particularly moral or other value-laden conclusions. Thus, from the perspective of
subjective rationality, all behavior is rational once the observer fully
understands the emotional-rational process of the given actor.57
Rational actors, thus, have developed a sense of themselves, a sense
of others, and a sense of how they are perceived by others," although
their senses and perceptions may be skewed or inaccurate.59 Actors,
therefore, are rational in that they consciously consider and adopt
specific, sometimes conflicting, goals and they aspire, with varying
degrees of success, to prioritize, to harmonize, and to attain their goals.
Arguably, the concept of subjective rationality in essence takes the
"rationality" out of "subjective rationality" because the actor, even if
deluded, will act in the manner she thinks will maximize pleasure and
minimize pain. Thus, she will always act rationally; she will always be

56.
57.

See supra Part II.H.
The explanation for this was set forth cogently by De Sousa:

No event is an action unless it has a teleological structure. Actions are
determined by wants and beliefs. The wants determine the goals of the act (even
if the act is done "for its own sake"). The beliefs pertain to the circumstances and

to ways of attaining the goal. And if the description of the act is sufficiently
circumscribed, no distinction can be made between the act's teleological structure
and its rationality. It is only when we enlarge the context to include other beliefs
and wants, as well as the arguments that have served to bring them into
existence, that the charge of irrationality may be made to stick.
DE SOUSA, supra note 25, at 159-60; see also Hill, supra note 9, at 688 ("Virtually any
decision may be 'rational' from a subjective standpoint-that is, from the standpoint of the
actor's own beliefs, values, and goals.") (emphasis added).
58. See generally GEORGE HERBERT MEADE, MIND, SELF AND SOCIETY (1934).
59.

The notion of a conscious, goal-oriented, cognitive, and choice-making actor

animates the modern theory of emotions. This Article will join those commentators who
augment that definition of the actor by positing, in a somewhat post-modern fashion, that
although existing in a real world, actors essentially construct their own definitions and
perceptions of reality. Subjective perceptions may be deemed reliable if they are accurate
predictors of the consequences of the actors' behavior. See, e.g., BATES, supra note 39, at
6-19.
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playing by some set of internal rules, conscious or unconscious, which,
when known, will reveal the rationality of her behavior. Some may
respond that a definition of rationality eschewing objective rationality or
defining all behavior as rational is not particularly useful. This Article
avers that it does have at least one significant use: If beliefs and goals
are subjective, then we need to remember as we assess the rationality
of how others behave that what we may perceive as irrational likely is
perfectly reasonable to the actor. If we can convince the actor to agree
with our assessment, then we might convince the actor to change her
concept of rationality and, thus, modify her behavior. The notion of
subjective rationality reminds us that we must always try to understand
the actor's perspective as well as our own.60
Some social scientists dispute rational choice theory, insofar as the
concept of rationality presumes that "persons ... seek to maximize their
own self-interest."6 1 The response is: both experience and a strong
body of research confirm that while people are goal oriented in their
significant endeavors, they nonetheless may act purportedly irrationally
by making errors. As systems theorist Frederick L. Bates explained,
"The mind of any thinker can be compared to a kind of cognitive garbage
can or trash bin into which many ideas have been dumped after they
have been formed and used for the great variety of particular cognitive
purposes pursued by all human actors."6 2 While actors may be goal
oriented and truly interested in attaining their aspirations with
minimum struggle, their minds are full of irrelevant, inconsistent, or
contradictory flotsam that comprises, according to Bates, cognitive
Thus, social
"garbage," inhibiting completely rational behavior.6"
science hardly has abandoned what S.E. Taylor styled the "motivated
tactician," who "is viewed as having multiple information processing
strategies available, selecting among them on the basis of goals, motives,
needs, and forces in the environment."64 It is just that a particular
"motivated tactician" may not be very adept.
The myriad natural and societal influences impressed upon a given
rational actor coupled with the fact that emotional responses are a

60. Cf DE SOUSA, supra note 25, at 186.
61. Hill, supra note 9, at 675 n.261.
62. BATES, supra note 39, at 24.
63. Id. "The idea called social behavior,when it is retrieved from memory, is therefore
apt to carry with it many inconsistent connotations and many irrelevancies as far as the
cognitive task faced by the user at a particular time is concerned." Id.
64.

S.E. TAYLOR, THE SOCIAL BEING IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL

PSYCHOLOGY 75 (D. Gilbert, S.T. Fiske, G. Lindzey, eds., 4th ed. 1998); see also Norbert
Schwarz, Warmer and More Social: Recent Developments in Cognitive Social Psychology,
1998 ANNU. REV. SOC. 239, 242 (1998).
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product of unconscious as well as conscious factors support Bates'

concept of cognitive garbage.6 5 An observer may not be able to understand fully and appreciate both her own emotions and the emotional
responses of someone she observes. In other words, understanding
emotions requires piercing two screens, the observer's and the actor's.
The observer ("0") observes and attempts to interpret the emotions of
the actor ("A") by correlating O's observations of A with the meanings 0
has experienced or been taught. Although A's actions and their
meanings are unique, they likely bear sufficient similarity to actions and
meanings that 0 understands."6 Using imagination and analogy, 0
attempts a four step analysis: (1) classifying A's acts; (2) unwrapping
the emotions reflected by A's acts; (3) determining what A's acts mean
to A; and (4) deciding what A's acts mean to the observer herself.6 7
The process often is imperfect because A may not fully understand and
thus may not accurately report her actions and 0 may be unaware of
how her own matrix of experience, perceptions, and beliefs may distort
her analysis of A's emotional state.6 ' The interpretive task is all the
more complex when 0 seeks to ascribe meaning, significance, or value
to A's emotions such as "A has no right to be angry with me" or "A
should be depressed; I would be under the same conditions." Social
scientists identify the difficulty as the lonely actor seeking a connection

65. See, e.g., LAZARUS, supra note 29, at 7, 18-19; see also MICHAEL LEWIS, SHAME, THE
EXPOSED SELF 32-34 (The Free Press 1992). "People's responses to events and situations
are, obviously, specific to their unique histories of experiences, expectations, desires, and
needs." Id. at 34.
66. Bates, for instance, believes that no observer can be objective because every
perception is filtered through the observer's subjective assessments of what she sees and
what it means. Nonetheless, as Bates acknowledged, observers are able to make
reasonably accurate assessments of how observed actors interpret both their own behavior
and the behavior of others. BATES, supra note 39, at 6-8.
67. See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 65, at 32-34; OATLEY, supra note 7, at 107-08. Hume
likewise accented the importance of the human ability to imagine what another person is
feeling and to analogize from one situation to another. As Hume explained, we seldom
judge for intrinsic value; rather we judge by comparing one object with another. Hume,
supra note 27, at 122, 160-61. See generally Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning:
Semantics, Pragmatics,and the RationalForce of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 923 (1996); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 86-98 (Harvard
Univ. Press 1990).
68. For example, 0 may misconstrue the facts as when she interpret's A's facial
expressions, gestures, and actions as anger when, in reality, A is depressed. Similarly,
both A and 0 may misconstrue the facts as when A says to 0, "I am angry at you" and both
0 and A believe that A is angry with 0 when actually A is depressed, that is, A is angry
at herself. Moreover, it is possible that A does not misinterpret herself, but 0 does. For
instance, A accurately relates to 0, "I am not angry at you; I am depressed," but 0
mistakenly decides that A has misjudged herself and actually is angry with 0.
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with other individuals and groups. There is a world of reality-"raw
reality" some call it 5 -- and actors learn about that reality in a social
setting.7 ° Thus, each actor constructs his or her own "cognitive reality"
or sets of realities comprised of received, "culturally derived elements,
for example, a symbolic code or language, a belief system, values, and so
on." 1 The interesting and ironic question is how well a given actor's
cognitive apparatus is able to:
predict the behavior of its environment and furnish useful responses
to the "empirical environment" it creates through its own cognitive
action. A cognitive system literally creates its own "facts" or "data" by
selecting, interpreting, codifying, and processing "sense impressions"
arising out of interaction between the cognitive apparatus itself and
the phenomenological environment to which it relates or with which it
interacts through observation.72
In this fundamental regard, each of us truly is alone within our
adopted, singular perspectives.7 3 That the project of observation and
interpretation is not hopeless, of course, is born out by human experience; if we were not correct much of the time, we would simply be
incapable of any social interactions. The assessments of the observer
may be imperfect. However, often they are good enough in that they
satisfactorily describe the actions of the actor, they adequately identify
the cluster of emotions underlying the actions, and they allow the
observer to devise and perform responsive actions.74 We may learn,
evaluate, amend, and adjust our "cognitive apparatus" based on the

69. See BATES, supra note 39, at 6.
70. Id. at 98-99; see also infra Parts II.D. and II.E. As Bates summarized the familiar
process, actors learn and perform patterns of behavior "in social units whereby a
population of individuals acting in relation to each other, and jointly in relation to [a social]
environment, establish stable, normalized patterns of interactions that allow the population
to survive and reproduce itself." BATES, supra note 39, at 98.
71. Id. at 7. Bates explicated the dynamic and ever shifting phenomenology of thought:
The mind, in contrast to the brain, is artificial in the sense that it is formed from
experience that itself is constructed out of previous experience as information
accumulates in the organism .... The mind is a self-generating, self-constructing
system or set of systems that is based on the organic capacity and predisposition
of the organism to construct an information file organized according to a
biologically based plan, and through which it constructs and continually
reconstructs itself and its environment.
Id. at 114.
72. Id. at 7.
73. "The cognitive apparatus.., is designed to deal only with the realityit itselfcreates
and not with other realitiesbrought to it by the reader or the critic on the basis of a belief
in the ultimate correctness of other theoretical formulations." Id.
74. Id. at 6-8.
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responses of others. Nonetheless, our interpretations are our own,
shared in large part while unique in all the world. Thus, absent
emotions, there can be no contact, no communication, and no interaction.' 5 Granted, actors may affect others without recourse to assessing
each other's emotions, but that interaction is not the same as communication and social interaction. One may carelessly drive one's car into
another person's vehicle and cause some sort of negative effect through
the accident, but that interaction is not social intercourse.7 6
D.

The Effects of Genes and Socialization

The aspect of the lonely actor leads to the recurring questions of
whether persons are genetically disposed to certain emotions and the
degree to which such dispositions preordain behavior. Emotions, after
all, are at their core physiological responses to stimuli.77 As noted
above, we feel emotions because of changes in our bodies that we have
learned to associate with the onset of emotions. Moreover, we notice
emotions in others through physical manifestations such as facial
expressions and other forms of body language.7" Thus, fully consistent
with the thesis of this Article, thought and emotion are physically linked
and interdependent. 79 An injection of the right substance at the right
time will cause the actor to have a decidedly different emotional reaction
to given stimuli than had there been no injection at all.
Nonetheless, a preponderance of commentators compellingly insists
that biology alone is not enough to explain either the generation of
emotions or, more importantly, how actors interpret and respond to their
emotions.8 0 While certainly not denying that biology affects behavior
and thus influences passionate reactions, "[miany philosophers and
psychologists have argued for the primacy of cultural aspects of
emotion."8 ' De Sousa, for instance, posited that the influence of biology
and evolution produces emotional inclinations that he called "tempera-

75. See, e.g., Robin West, Love, Rage and Legal Theory, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 101,
102 (1989); Nussbaum, supra note 25, at 24-25; infra Parts I.D. and II.E.
76. See, e.g., Bates, supra note 39, at 93.
77. See, e.g., LAZARUS, supra note 29, at 26-29; OATLEY, supra note 7, at 14.
78. LAZARUS, supra note 29, at 69-75; LEWIS, supra 65, at 20-21.

79. See ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, THE FEELING OF WHAT HAPPENS: BODY AND EMOTION IN
THE MAKING OF CONSCIOUSNESS (Harcourt Brace & Co. 1999); ANTONIO R. DAMASIO,
DESCARTES' ERROR (Avon Books 1994) (arguing that cognitive analytical process is

physically impossible without emotions).
80. See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 65, at 20-21; LAZARUS, supra note 29, at 75-78; Kahan
& Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 296.
81. Pillsbury, supra note 16, at 683 n.91.
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ments." 2 Undoubtedly, societal influences modify the acting out of
discrete temperaments and, in certain instances, to some degree, may
modify the temperaments themselves. Nonetheless, the eminence of
given temperaments may allow the actor to resist social influences in
certain cases or may strongly affect which among conflicting influences
will prevail.8" As De Sousa clarified:
We need to allow for the idea that ... a certain degree of self-assertion
by rebellion [] is essential to ego development. And I suspect the
biological factors I have bundled under the name of 'temperament"
may be responsible for a great many differences between individual
natures in respect of the style, strength, and direction of the rebellion . '
Approaching the issue from a different tack, Lazarus reasoned through
example that a smile may be a biological-physiological response to any
number of emotions: joy, love, compassion, vengeance, anger, even
fear. 5 The study of biology alone, therefore, cannot provide sufficient
analytical tools to decipher what the smile means.8"
Most commentators, then, eschew the idea that individuals are
helpless pawns of their biology:87
In recent years cognitive theories ... have dominated both the
philosophical and the psychological literature on the subject. Cognitive
theories come in many varieties, but all share the idea that cognition
is central to emotion. By cognition I mean a perception which we can
determine to be correct or incorrect according to rational principles. A
cognitive approach holds that emotion is a cognitive assessment of a
person or situation, which assessment is associated with a physiological
sensation, normally accompanied by a desire to undertake a particular
kind of action."

82. DE SOUSA, supra note 25, at 252.
83. Id. at 251.
84. Id. at 252.
85. LAZARUS, supra note 29, at 69-75.
86. Id. at 75-78.
87. "Were emotions disturbances of the gut (or sympathetic nervous system or
whatever), the difference would be nothing but a difference in the tweaks, twinges, and
pangs ... people feel-and what about that would lead us to select one over the other as
a friend?" Sabini & Silver, supra note 9, at 168 (emphasis added).
88. Pillsbury, supra note 16, at 675 (footnotes omitted); see also Gewirtz, supra note 11,
at 1030) ("More recently, a chorus of scholars from fields as diverse as philosophy,
psychology, and neurobiology has demonstrated that emotions have a cognitive dimension,
are connected to beliefs, and can promote, illuminate, and convey understanding in many
ways.") (footnote omitted).
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Thus, when one experiences an emotion, as personal as that experience is, it is likewise a sociological event.8 s Surely biology alone, for
example, cannot explain why one judge believes that substantive due
process should prohibit the criminalization of privately performed acts
of homosexual sodomy between consenting adults while a different judge
would not accord this protection.9" The pervasive influence of social
forces is so well known its mention herein is mandated simply to provide
a complete analytical framework. As Hume, among many others,
observed with his characteristic verve, "We can form no wish, which has
not a reference to society."91 If Hume's statement is hyperbolic, it is so
only by a small degree. Because passions are essential to derive
meaning from a particular situation, and because society, in its myriad
forms, imparts contexts within which to ascribe meaning, emotions are
essential to comprehending social experience, and social forces influence
the generation and understanding of emotions.92

E. The Learning Process
Professor Pillsbury deftly summarized the social learning process: "By
cultural influence and direct education we learn which emotions are
appropriate in particular situations and which are not. We learn to
regulate their degree and the manner of their expression."93 This
learning process begins at birth. As Professor Nussbaum noted, we all

Feelings have powerful effects on cognitive processes: serving as a selective filter
that admits some material and excludes others, determining what gets stored in
memory, giving greater salience to some information, affecting what records can
be retrieved from memory, influencing thinking and judgment as people evaluate
themselves and their environment.
Welch, supra note 4, at 67 (footnote omitted).
89. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 296-97; Pillsbury, supra note 16, at 681;
Welch, supra note 4, at 77.
90. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 67, at 130-53 (discussing generally how political
factors and social visions affect judges).
91. HUME, supra note 27, at 112.
92.

See, e.g., ROBERT C. SOLOMON, A PASSION FOR JUSTICE-EMOTIONS AND THE

ORIGINS OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Addison-Wesley Pub. Inc. 1990) (explaining how
emotions are integral to the formation of a theory and system of societal justice).
93. Pillsbury, supra note 16, at 681. As with most of the theory of emotions, the
antecedents go back millennia. Aristotle, it will be recalled, accented the need for
individuals to be educated in the emotions in order to lead good lives in society. See, e.g.,
DE SOUSA, supra note 25, at 183; Sabini & Silver, supra note 9, at 171; HUME, supra note
27, at 154-59.
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learn from infancy that emotions are not limited to one situation but are
94
essential to developing a more comprehensive world view.
De Sousa coined a most useful and expressive term explaining that
from early childhood we are inculcated with "paradigm scenarios" drawn
from, "stories, art, and culture," and, later on, through literature.95 De
Sousa's construct of paradigm scenarios provides three necessary
components for any particular emotional episode. First, paradigm
scenarios designate an "object," that is, the person, thing, or event giving
rise to the emotion and about which the actor evaluates and adopts an
invented response.9" Classically, for instance, the object of the emotion
romantic love is one's paramour. Second, the paradigm scenario
furnishes the one or more acceptable or "normal" responses to the
situation, "where normality is first a biological matter and then very
quickly becomes a cultural one."97 Lastly, in addition to providing
means to identify clusters of emotions and to formulate responses,
paradigm scenarios culturally indoctrinate individuals, providing not
simply responses but also motivations and goals. In this sometimes
overlooked or underestimated manner, emotions become more than the
individual's physically felt siren that something has occurred important
enough to require a response. Emotions are integral to the process of
creating and perpetuating goals and desires.9" This function, of course,
brings us back to our initial definition of emotions as motivators of

94. NUSSBAUM, supra note 5, at 68. Learning emotional responses, of course, is part
of the greater project of social learning, that is, socially created elements including
language, belief systems, and values. BATES, supra note 39, at 7, 98-99. As Bates
explained, each individual draws, "the resources necessary to sustain the life of the
individual" from socio-behavioral systems. The "adaptive behavior" of individuals, "is
usually performed in social units whereby a population of individuals acting in relation to
each other, and jointly in relation to an environment, establish stable, normalized patterns
of interaction that allow the population to survive and reproduce itself." We see all this
moving in time through "repeated episodes of action and interaction." Id. at 98-99.
95. DE SOUSA, supra note 25, at 182. Certainly, De Sousa's concept of "literature" is
broad enough to encompass more than fiction including texts of history, law, philosophy,
and theory.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Oatley offered an apt summary applicable to what De Sousa designated as the
three functions of paradigm scenarios:
Each goal and plan has a monitoring mechanism that evaluates events relevant
to it. When a substantial change of probability occurs of achieving an important
goal or subgoal, the monitoring mechanism broadcasts to the whole cognitive
system a signal that can set it into readiness to respond to this change. Humans
experience these signals and the states of readiness they induce as emotions.
OATLEY, supra note 7, at 50 (emphasis added).

2001]

RUSSIAN DRESSING

1055

behavior. Thus, emotions are essential to all personal and social
projects, including law.99
The educative process continues through adulthood but in ever more
complex ways as early, simple paradigm scenarios are modified,
expanded, supplemented, and, occasionally, discarded through the
experience of living. "Learning these scenarios continues indefinitely...
as the emotional repertoire becomes more complicated." °° Of course,
the task of emotional interpretation immediately is complicated further
because society is not monolithic. An individual's emotional responses
and her interpretations. of her responses are affected by diverse and
possibly conflicting societal structures such as family, friends, schools,
organizations, government, and the like.'
The learning process becomes additionally complicated because
paradigm scenarios are not necessarily clear, absolute, and certain. A
particular scenario may be vague even with regard to the criteria that
inspired the scenario. For instance, a given culture may be ambivalent
about love-when to make sacrifices for the sake of the loved one and
when to act selfishly.0 2 No single paradigm scenario likely will be
applicable to all facts; thus, the culture may construct a host of highly
specific scenarios, some calling for sacrifice and some calling for rapacity.
There may be no clear way to reconcile those scenarios in the face of a
new situation with attributes of scenarios calling for selflessness and
attributes of scenarios calling for selfishness.
Thus, the difficulty of understanding emotions arises in part because,
within a given culture, the lessons of paradigm scenarios will be subject
to several reasonable interpretations, especially with regard to analogy,
that is, applying scenarios to a situation similar to but different in
significant regards from the familiar contexts defining the scenarios.0 3
Even if a given paradigm scenario is so artfully drawn and masterfully
taught that its application is unambiguous within the factual context
from which that scenario sprung, great and reasonable doubt may exist
with regard to applying the scenario to similar but factually distinct
cases. This uncertainty led De Sousa to surmise, "Like scientific
paradigms, ...emotions are better at stimulating research in certain

99. See, e.g., Gewirtz, supra note 11, at 1029-30 & n.14; West, supra note 10, at 143436; Margulies, supra note 23, at 1129-35; Pillsbury, supra note 16, at 656-57, 677.
100. DE SOUSA, supra note 25, at 183; accord OATLEY, supra note 7, at 24-28.
101. See, e.g., Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 296-97.
102. See, e.g., Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 296.
103. See, e.g., DE SOUSA, supra note 25, at 188; Lewis, supra note 65, at 32-34; OATLEY,
supra note 7, at 107-08; POSNER, supra note 67, at 86-98 (discussing the use and limits of
analogy).
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directions than at finding compelling and fair reasons for their own
adoption. They are too 'deep' for that, too unlike specific beliefs."10 4
F

Coercion, Emotions, and Morality

Of course, the fact that commentators refer to it as a "learning
process" cannot negate the actuality that individuals and groups use
coercion as well as persuasion in their attempts to influence others to
adopt their paradigm scenarios. 105 As Professor Bandes observed, "The
characterization of some emotional variables, stances, or mechanisms as
'emotional' and others as 'reasonable' is an assertion of power-a
camouflaged decision to marginalize the former and privilege the
latter."106 Individuals and groups habitually use various forms of
compulsion and constraint to promote their own paradigm scenarios and
Undeniably, the process through
attendant behavior patterns.0 7
which individuals accept and imbue paradigm scenarios is partisan.
The reality that, in substantial degree, meanings and responses to
emotions are socially learned, has led philosophers and psychologists to
agree, as they must, that the meanings and responses ascribed to
emotions in given contexts are moral judgments. Thus, emotions are
integral to the creation and perpetuation of personal moral principles.0"
At this point, the reader can hardly be surprised that the linkage of
emotions and morality goes back to Aristotle, as De Sousa accented:
A child is genetically programmed to respond in specific ways to the
situational components of some paradigm scenarios. But what
situational components can be identified depends on the child's stage
of development. An essential part of education consists in identifying
these responses, giving the child a name for them in the context of the

Michael C. Dorf, Truth, Justice and the
104. DE SOUSA, supra note 25, at 198; cf.,
American Constitution, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 133, 151 (1997) (positing methodological
similarities between arguably conflicting genres of jurisprudence, such as postmodernism
and Dworkinian concepts of law as "integrity," "illustrate the irrelevancy of a theory of law
to the resolution of legal questions-even quite abstract legal questions such as 'How does
a judge discern the law?'").
105. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 296-97 (explaining groups and societies
often attempt to suppress and to control emotional responses in discrete situations).

106. Bandes, supra note 17, at 370, 385, 409; Delgado, supra note 23, at 666-67;
Margulies, supra note 23, at 1126.
107. See, e.g., West, supra note 75, at 107.
108. See, e.g., LAZARUS, supra note 29, at 194; Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 9, at

297-301; Pillsbury, supra note 16, at 681.

As Dean Welsh concluded, "Appropriate

emotional responses are not only possible ingredients in moral decision-making but are

essential elements in the process." Welch, supra note 4, at 77.
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scenario, and thus teaching it that it is experiencing a particular
emotion. That is, in part, what is involved in learning to feel the right
emotions, which, as Aristotle knew, is the central part of moral
education. "o

Hume went so far to aver that "[miorality has no foundation in
nature.""' Morality, Hume argued, is founded upon the expectation
of pleasure from attaining an "advantage" that generates the emotion or
passion of "pride," a sense of self-worth and satisfaction. Conversely,
morality likewise is founded on the fear of pain arising from a disadvantage manifested as "humility," that is, a loss of personal worth. For
Hume, the meaning of morality arises not from natural law but from the
personal-social context of emotions generally categorized into "pride"-an
"agreeable impression" of the self-and "humility"-a disagreeable selfimpression."'
Given the nature of emotions as substantially socially mastered, many
contemporary theorists shun the value-laden inquiries that intrigued
investigators during the last two hundred years, specifically, whether
certain emotions inherently are good and others are bad." 2 These
investigators rejected the project of devising a meta-theory linking
Rather, the
discrete emotions to discrete notions of good and evil.'

109. DE SOUSA, supra note 25, at 183 (citing Nicomachean Ethics, 11.2); see also Sabini
& Silver, supra note 9, at 171 "[Aristotle] argues that the practice of moderation in action
acts back on the passions to produce a balance, or harmony, of the passions themselves.");
Martha Nussbaum, Aristotle,Feminism and Needs for Functioning,70 TEXAS L. REV. 1019,
1022 (1992).
110. HUME, supra note 27, at 54.
111. Id. at 54-56. Hume recognized, naturally enough, that humility does not
necessarily lead to moral conduct nor does pride necessarily result in immoral behavior.
This is not to imply that Hume was a relativist who felt that nothing is intrinsically good
or corrupt. Hume believed that people may choose benevolent passions over selfish ones
in discrete situations. Often individuals select duty over personal gain and, indeed, society
depends on individuals embracing a sense of responsibility. But, Hume disagreed fully
with the rationalistic, or what would later be denoted the Kantian, ideal that such duty
and devotion are the triumph of reason through the suppression of emotion. Rather, they
are the mastery of unselfish emotions over self-centered ones. See, e.g., PENELHUM, supra
note 5, at 125.
112. Not all commentators, however, have abandoned the enterprise of attempting to
prove that certain emotions are worthier than others in civil society. See, e.g., JUSTIN
OAKLEY, MORALITY AND EMOTIONS 75-78 (1992); W. GEORGE TURSKI, TOWARD A
RATIONALITY OF EMOTIONS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 146 (1994).

113. See, e.g., West, supra note 10, at 1432 ("After forty years of formulating,
reformulating, and rejecting principles with which to resolve issues of racial justice, it is
becoming harder ... to see precisely what any of these principles-whether the principle
of colorblindness, or anticaste, or antisubordination, or antidiscrimiation-are doing,
beyond providing fancy rhetorical garb for slogans."); see also Dorf, supra note 104, at 151.
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good or bad resulting from an emotion and responses thereto are
contextual, with meanings arising from the given situation based on the
value judgments of the actor and those observing the actor, all of whom
may disagree.""
G. Emotions and Reason-An Inextricable Collaboration
The foregoing demonstrates that emotions are not solely, nor even
predominately, a matter of instinctive response or genetically predisposed reflex. Rather, the recognition of meanings ascribed to and choice
of responses regarding experienced emotions is a matter of indoctrination. If, as prevailing theory posits, emotions are learned, then any
individual's emotional response in any given situation must be, in
substantial part, an intellectual effort. Thus, a pivotal aspect of
emotions now may be introduced.
Theorists, particularly Hume,
correctly and profoundly described the systemic, inevitable collaboration
between reason and emotion and, in so doing, explained why both are
essential to human behavior. Hume expressed the verity with stunning
brevity: "Reason alone can never produce any action.""' Emotions
and reason might be separated conceptually but not pragmatically, for
of the cognitive-phenomenological system
they are the integral elements
16
that gives rise to action.

114. A typical and illustrative example question is whether "vengeance" is a "bad"
emotion because vengeance inspires an actor to harm someone as retribution for a
perceived injury. Doubtless, vengeance is personal, selfish, and often crude, although some
forms of vengeance, as history and literature show, may be elegantly complex and subtle.
Even according it a propensity for subtlety, some commentators aver that although the
urge for vengeance under certain situations is understandable, it should be suppressed in
favor of "kinder" emotions such as compassion and love, particularly the love of justice.
Ironically perhaps, without a sense of vengeance, an individual may not understand that
she has been wronged and thus may not consider appropriate steps to ameliorate her
injury. See, e.g., SOLOMON, supra note 92, at 40-43. Vengeance then is not antithetical to
justice. To the contrary, a theory of justice must include a reasonable sense of vengeance-the recognition both that one has been harmed and that one is entitled to see the
wrongdoer punished. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality
opinion) (noting that the desire for retribution in the form of capital punishment for certain
crimes "is essential in an ordered society that asks its citizens to rely on legal processes
rather than self-help to vindicate their wrongs."); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 948-51
(1983) (holding judge may express outrage at defendant's conduct when imposing death
sentence).
115. HUME, supra note 27, at 156.
116. It may be true that an emotion alone may arouse an instinctive or unconscious
response. One may freeze or run at the sight of something deadly without conscious
reflection. In that sense, it may be argued that some emotional responses can arise
without a rational process of reflection, at least on the conscious level. Often though the
unconscious response to emotions is the first step-the "trigger"-in a given emotional-
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Of course, in a positive fashion, emotions may be conceived of as
conceptually distinct from reason, but understanding human motivation
and behavior requires the ability to visualize emotions and reasoning
working together and at once. 1 ' Identically, conceptually an actor can
engage in a process of pure reason such as solving a math problem,
rationally but without passion. To illustrate, Hume disagreed not with
the notion that the math problem could be solved rationally, but with
the idea that either the act of solving or the solution itself could be
Conceptual
meaningful to the actor without appeal to passion."'
reasoning such as mathematics might be performed according to its
logic, Hume concluded, but it carries no intrinsic significance, or
motivational force, until it is used as a tool, as when a merchant
balances her books. Thus, one may struggle over a math problem but
only ascribe consequence by way of passion and reflection combined such
as pride in success, frustration in failure, or satisfaction in balancing the
books." 9
As Professor Nussbaum discerned through a profound
illustration, "Intellect without emotion is, we might say, value-blind: it
lacks the sense of the meaning and worth of a person's death that the
judgements internal to emotions would have supplied." 2 ° That the
death occurred by accident as opposed to murder, suicide, or natural
causes has meaning only insofar as instructed by the paradigm scenarios
processes associated
adopted by social actors-the emotional-rational
21
with assessing the pertinence of death.

rational episode in which conscious reflection plays an integral role. For the projects of
legal decision-making, certainly the emotional process will require some conscious rational
reflection. See infra Part II.H.
117. See, e.g., HUME, supra note 27, at 154-59.
118. "Abstract or demonstrative reasoning... never influences any of our actions, but
only as it directs our judgment concerning causes and effects." Id. at 155.
119. The math problem for a merchant then is only meaningful "[blut that he may
learn what sum will have the same effects in paying his debt, and going to market, as all
the particular articles taken together." Id. (emphasis in original).
120. NUSSBAUM, supra note 7, at 68.
121. Indeed, the earliest philosophers on legal advocacy understood that the meaning
of a fact comes not simply by its happening but by the significance imparted to the fact by
actors and observers. Quintilian, for example, boldly admonished,
"[T]he purpose of the statement of the facts is not merely to instruct, but rather
to persuade the judge .... I am ... surprised at those who hold that there
[W]hy,
should be no appeal to the emotions in the statement of the facts ....
while I am instructing the judge, should I refuse to move him as well?"
Michael Frost, Ethos, Pathos and Legal Audience, 99 DICK. L. REV. 85, 95-96 (1994)
(quoting QUINTILIAN, 2 INSTITUTIO ORATORIA 155, at 61, 111 (H.E. Butler trans. 1954)).
Presaging Hume, Quintilian correspondingly cautioned that withholding an emotional
interpretation of facts until the closing argument is defeating, for when facts initially are
presented, the judge will experience some emotional reactions with which to interpret those
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Of equal profundity, modem research tells us that the psychology of
thinking and the physiology of thinking are intertwined and mutually
dependent:
feelings are a powerful influence on reason, [and] the brain systems
required by the former are enmeshed in those needed by the latter, and
[I such specific systems are interwoven with those which regulate the
body ....It is as if we are possessed by a passion for reason, a drive
that originates in the brain core, permeates other levels of the nervous
system, and emerges as either feelings or nonconscious biases to guide
decision making. Reason, from the practical to the theoretical, is
probably constructed on this inherent drive. ... 122
Dean Welch deftly summarized the point: "A style of thinking that is
totally disinterested, without affective connection, is simply not a
possibility for flesh and blood human beings."123
Accordingly, a life void of emotions, if possible, would be empty of
meaning and all that flows from meaning. Once this fact is understood,
the nay-sayers to the integral affiliation of reason and emotion must be
proved wrong. The projects rather are understanding and judging the
emotional-rational interplay of given actors.
H.

The Mechanics of the Emotional-RationalMelding

We are ready now to move to the mechanics of the process. Although
different theorists provide somewhat differing descriptions, most agree
that the two fundamental elements of the emotional-rational process are
the trigger and the evaluation. These commentators, however, make a
significant error: They see emotion and reason working together yet as
separate agents when the creation of meaning, in fact, is the coalescing-the melding-of the two.
1. The Trigger. Philosophers and psychologists concur that the
initial trigger of the emotional process is a sense of harm or benefit to

data. Having expended the energy in this emotional-rational process to form an initial
impression of the facts, the judge is prone to adopt that impression as the correct
one-what is known as a "calm passion" (see Part II.i.--that will be difficult to excite,
much less amend, at a later moment during the trial. The initial factual presentation,
then, is the advocate's opportunity to instruct the judge as to the preferred emotionalrational understanding of the facts. Quintilian wisely admonished, "'Once the habit of
mind is formed, it is hard to change it.'" Id. at 99 (quoting QUINTILIAN, supra, at 111).
122. DEMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR, supra note 79, at 245; see also DEMASIO, THE
FEELING OF WHAT HAPPENS,

123.

supra note 79.

Welch, supra note 4, at 66-68 (footnotes omitted).
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The pleasure or pain may be

purely
physical or, more likely, simultaneously physical and psychologi125
cal.
Something occurs; some trigger inspires an emotion that the actor

experiences as the set of physical-psychological symptoms she has
learned to associate with the given emotion. The trigger diverts the
actor from other immediate projects, requiring the actor to engage in
some conscious reflection upon the new emotion. The trigger arises
unbidden and from outside the actor, what Professor Pillsbury referred
to as "[tihe suddenness of the experience. " 126 We do not choose
initially to experience an emotion, nor do we choose what will activate
that initial emotion.

2. The Evaluation Process.

As a result of the trigger, the actor

begins to reason, that is, to contemplate, to reflect on what has caused
the sudden emotion or cluster of emotions. Reviewing the information
available, the actor selects a "target," that is, an object or event that the

actor believes triggered the emotions. This step leads to the next level
of reasoning, the selection of a "motive" about the target, meaning the
attributes of, or beliefs about, the target that stimulated the emotions.127 This identification of a target and the ascribing of motives
may occur in a matter of moments or over a longer time period if the
situation is more complex or obscure. In addition, the motives may be
unconscious or partially unconscious as might well occur in the case of

124. See, e.g., LAZARUS, supra note 29, at 18-19, 57, 92-104; OATLEY, supra note 7, at
19; HUME, supra note 27, at 54-56. Indeed, Hume noted a commonly recognized link
between pain-pleasure and the law. Human law of all types is founded on the granting of
rewards and the threat of punishments. Identifying what will work as a reward or a
punishment, of course, is based on observations of what triggers certain responses in many,
perhaps most, members of a given society. HUME, supra note 27, at 152.
125. It may be argued that the pain-pleasure framework is meaningless because it
proves too much. If all human endeavor is based on avoiding pain and maximizing
pleasure, then we really know nothing except that when an actor performs some act, even
one that seems to hurt her, she chose to perform the act because she guessed that, of all
available options, the chosen act was the least painful or the most pleasurable. Of course,
the interesting question is why the actor decided to perform a given act over all other
alternatives. The pain-pleasure approach simply provides the opening concept inevitably
leading to the more important inquiries such as what were the actor's options, what did
she think her options were, and why did she select the chosen option?
126. Pillsbury, supra note 16, at 679.
127. DE SOUSA, supra note 25, at 115-16, 335-36.
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a phobia when the12 affected individual may be unaware of the reasons
why she is phobic.

1

Next, the actor contemplates paradigm scenarios to assess what seems
to be at stake, what are the benefits or detriments that may be
generated in this situation. The actor gauges the perceived benefits and
detriments from a matrix of personal long-term and short-term goals, or
a "goal hierarchy," resulting from years of education and indoctrination,
cumulative personal experience, and perhaps some genetic predisposition. 129 Thus, the process of the cognition of emotions-of rational
thought-continues. The assessment, understandably, includes choosing
one or more goals from a hierarchy of personal goals and forecasting the
probable personal costs engendered by alternative possible responses
designed to attain, in whole or part, one or more goals. The actor will
choose the behavior pattern resulting in the greatest pleasure and least
displeasure and will distinguish potential behavior patterns by the
emotions attendant to each.
In sum, as Oatley described,
emotions derive from cognitive processes for integrating multiple and
sometimes vague goals and for managing the associated plans that are
enacted with limited resources in an uncertain environment, often in

conjunction with other people. Happy emotions occur when coordination between plans is being achieved and unanticipated events are
assimilated. Distressing emotions occur when coordination fails, or
when some plan goes badly, when a problem emerges that cannot be
solved from current resources or when an important background goal
is violated. Emotions function to allow otherwise disparateaspects of
a complex system to be coordinated.3 '

It is worth accenting that the evaluative process is fraught with
complicating factors including the following: (1) the actor works under
time constraints; (2) the actor must sort numerous, possibly conflicting

128.

The mingling of an unconscious goal or mode of interpretation with conscious goals

and conscious reflection may mean that
conscious intentions may not cause the action, although rationalization may be
offered later. In other words, plans may be scheduled by processes that are not
fully integrated with any consciously assessable representation .... Correspondence between the cognitive-theoretical idea of goals that direct plans and the

reasons people give for actions therefore becomes problematic ....
supra note 7, at 34 (citations omitted).
129. See, e.g., DE SOUSA, supra note 25, at 118-21; LAZARUS, supra note 29, at 33, 9499; OATLEY, supra note 7, at 24-50.
OATLEY,

130. QATLEY, supra note 7, at 43-44 (emphasis added). It is worth recalling that
whether an emotion is pleasant or unpleasant to a given actor does not necessarily mean
that the attendant results are good or bad.
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emotions, which the actor herself likely does not fully understand; (3) the
actor exists in a context of incomplete and incorrect information,
affecting her ability to reflect comprehensively on the given emotions; (4)
the actor must choose among possibly vague and conflicting goals and
contrast the probability of goal attainment with each possible response
to the emotional stimuli; and (5) the reflection process occurs consciously, unconsciously or both.
The foregoing becomes extraordinarily complex and exquisitely
intricate because it is a systemic process and is, therefore, repeated,
often numerous times, as the actor assesses and reassesses the meaning
of an initial emotion or set of emotions and the meanings of emotions
resulting therefrom. The interplay of emotion and reason is phenomenological; therefore, we must tweak our concept to envision emotions and
reason not simply interacting but actually merging, generating new or
revised emotions and assessments, and merging again to create meaning
which, in turn, inspires other emotional-rational meanings. Modern
"systems theory" supplies a paradigm requiring observers to visualize
events flowing through time. Sociologist Frederick L. Bates explained
the point:
[A] defining characteristic of a system is the idea that systems are
always viewed as objects that operate, behave, or function. They are
never static in the sense of being motionless, inert, dead, or in a state
of functional entropy. In systems, things are happening; energy or
pseudoenergy is being expended."'
Thus, to engage in systemic analysis is to see things always moving,
unlike a static, pure structural analysis. Through systemic inputs and
feedbacks, we sort and reflect on a myriad of scenarios, weighing their
meaning, evaluating their applicability, choosing among conflicting
scenarios, and, through imagination and analogy, constructing new ones.
Possible meanings causing the most discomfort to the decision maker are
rejected; the one that causes the most comfort or least discomfort is
accepted. The degree of comfort or discomfort is felt by emotions; reason
informs what these emotions mean. However, emotions inform whether
our reasoning is apt (comfortable) or inapt (uncomfortable), which
meaning, in turn, is informed by reason. The process swirls in a system
of inputs and feedback culminating in one or more decisions that are the
product of emotion and reason uniting as meaning. The systemic whirl
and interplay merges emotion and reason-where one ends and one
begins becomes indistinguishable. What is important is that the
melding of emotion and reason is understood as meaning. That system

131.

BATES, supra note 39, at 80.
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is inborn in the biology of human beings. Without emotions we cannot
apply reason; without reason we cannot understand our variety of
emotional impulses; and the construction of meaning is the product of
the coalescing of emotions and reason."3 2
How then can we visualize the systemic, processional blending of
emotion and reason? At the risk of skirting the edge of flippancy, I
propose the "Russian Dressing" theory. That is, if we can conceptualize
how that particular condiment is made, we can imagine how emotions
and reason interact.
Although subject to culinary embellishments not germane to this
inquiry, the basic recipe for Russian Dressing is roughly equal parts of
mayonnaise and ketchup. Mayonnaise and ketchup are each uniquely
describable relishes, packaged separately and conceptually distinct with
regard to composition, taste, texture, and other characteristics. If one
wants Russian Dressing, one must combine these two ingredients,
producing something distinctly different from the two ingredients
separately. It might be protested that all recipes render something
unique from a combination of ingredients. To a degree that is true, but
often the distinctive flavor of one or more items predominates. When
you pour milk over cereal, usually you get soggy cereal that tastes like
cereal plus milk, rather than resembling something new. Similarly,
buttered toast tastes like toast plus butter, a combination if you will,
where both tastes merge slightly but essentially seem to layer upon the
taste buds as toast and butter.
Not so blending mayonnaise and ketchup. Although the resultant
Russian Dressing bears some similarities to the predecessor ingredients,
it does not look like ketchup-red-nor mayonnaise-white-nor is it
striped. Rather, it is pink, a true blending of the two ingredients.
Similarly, Russian Dressing tastes distinctly different from either
ketchup or mayonnaise. Though the discerning pallet could identify the
ingredients, the resultant flavor is unique.
Admittedly, the cultural habit of separating emotion and rationality
makes it more difficult to imagine them as one than to appreciate
Russian Dressing as distinct from ketchup and mayonnaise. However,
to understand how people in fact evaluate and accord value and
significance to ideas and events, we must envision the systemic process
in which emotion and reason coalesce and render a new product: an
actor's expression of what something means. Granted, we will understand the meanings we ascribe, and we will attempt to grasp the
meanings ascribed by others through the feelings engendered by the

132.

See, e.g., DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR, supra note 79, at 245.
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emotional-rational process. We call those feelings emotions. Those
feelings are like the taste of Russian Dressing; they tell us what the new
product is, pleasing or unpleasant under the given circumstances.
Of course, to test and to alter the result of a given emotional-rational
episode, the actor or observer will explore the process, discerning and
evaluating both the emotions and modes of reasoning. The Russian
Dressing metaphor reminds the actor and the observer that the critiqued
behavior or event is the result of a systemic process, moving through
time, in which the necessary ingredients (emotion and reason) must
intermingle or no behavior will result to critique.
Perhaps the most effective extant jurisprudence to approach a Russian
Dressing/systemic philosophy of emotion with reason is "narrative
theory." Put too simply to capture fully the richness of this school of
legal thought, narrative theory recognizes that individuals and groups
relate and interpret experiences through the use of stories and the
process of narrative,'3 3 that is, communicating clusters of stories that,
taken as an entirety, impart lessons, define ethics, and instruct modes
of conduct.'3
Correspondingly, narrative jurisprudence argues that
the processes of law building and legal decision making, no less than any
other human enterprise, involves reviewing and choosing among
separate stories brought together in a lattice of narrative. Societal
actors tell stories and receive the stories of others through any number
of informal and formal social structures, including courts of law. Is5

133. "Narrative" is
a broader enterprise that encompasses the recounting (production) and receiving
(reception) of stories. This enterprise functions to organize certain kinds of
problems into a form that renders culturally meaningful both the problems and
their possible resolutions ....
The narrative consists of the cumulative effects of
these separate stories as their aggregate meaning comes to light. By organizing
discrete stories and constructing their "point," narrative is interactive and social;
it represents one collective way of knowing things, one communal mechanism for
grasping the world.
Jane B. Baron & Julia Epstein, Is Law Narrative?, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 141, 147-48 (1997).
134. See, e.g,, Bandes, supra note 17, at 383-85.
135. "The transformative insight of narrative scholarship is that narrative structure
and conventions shape all legal discourse." Bandes, supra note 17, at 382-83 (footnote
omitted). Even critics of the narrative school of jurisprudence soundly recognize that law
is made and perpetuated by imparting stories such as accounts of events at trial and
testimony of personal experiences before legislative committees. See, e.g., Barron &
Epstein, supra note 133, at 149 ("[Nlarrative in law can be helpful as a way of elucidating
how meaning is made in legal contexts. This is not to say that all meaning, in or outside
of law, is somehow ineluctably narrative in character.") (footnote omitted). Understanding
and interpreting stories and the process of telling stories "can improve our understanding
of law." Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The 200,000 Cards of Dimitri Yurasov:
FurtherReflections On ScholarshipAnd Truth, 46 STAN. L. REV. 647, 647 (1994).
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From given stories or lines of narrative, actors employ imagination and
metaphors to expand the narrative web into scenarios related, albeit
different, from those giving rise to the original stories. Narrative and
the lessons of narrative become the basis for rule making and social
control including law and legal process.'36 Clearly, as with emotions
and reason, the process of narrative is socially learned. The form and
structure of stories are socially imparted, as are modes of interpretation.
The touchstone of narrative theory holds that knowledge of the
emotional content of stories is essential to understanding the motivations and meanings underlying the behavior of individuals and their
constituent groups. 3 ' Narrative theory intrepidly espouses what other
schools of theory either deny or heuristically minimize-that to
understand fully and to practice law, one must appreciate that all legal
events-trials, judicial decision making, legislation, administrative
procedures, and the like-are the products of the emotional-rational
process of the constituent actors. Thus, to comprehend law, one must
know a great deal about the culture from which law springs and over
which law holds influence. Culture, in turn, is appreciated not simply
by its political economy, but also by the narrative of its groups and
subgroups. To comprehend narrative, or the composite stories of the
given narrative, the actor must grasp the imparted meanings. As we
know, meaning and significance are generated, shared, and interpreted
not rationally, but through an emotional-rational process. Therefore, to
understand the narratives that comprise law, one must perceive the
constituent combined emotions and reason.'

136. See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 17, at 383-85.
137. Id. at 382-90; see also Margulies, supra note 23, at 1113, 1126. Indeed, critics of
narrative theory see its embracing of emotion as evidence that the paradigm lacks
intellectual standards and intellectual rigor. See, e.g., Gewirtz, supra note 11, at 1045
("Much of this work, I think, puts too much emphasis on emotions, particularity, and
subjectivity, and too little on reasoned analysis or general rules."). That a narrative
approach to law is extremely useful for both description and interpretation, however, is
well established in the literature. See, e.g., Margulies, supra note 23, at 1126-44
(discussing, inter alia, how major theorists from Machiavelli to Hannah Arendt have
recognized that law, morality, culture, and attendant modes of behavior are taught and
honed through stories as exemplars).
138. In this regard, it is vital to emphasize that despite the reproach of some concerned

critics, the narrative paradigm does not and ought not be taken as an abandonment of such
sound principles of investigation as reasoned analysis and empiricism. Some commentators
say that narrative theory eschews reason and encourages "abandoning the expectation that
legal scholarship contain reason and analysis as well as narrative." Farber & Sherry,
supra note 135, at 648. Narrative theorists rightly bristle at the accusation of pervasive
intellectual laziness. As Professor Delgado responded, "[Farber and Sherry's] point is that

stories in themselves teach little unless supplemented with analysis and commentary that
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Thus, narrative theory instructs us to be aware of emotions-to
employ the emotional-rational process gladly, unashamedly and without
apology. To do so, we must seek to understand the stories and the
overall narrative by experience and analogy, thereby cultivating
imagination "capable of perceiving the individual humanity of the people
involved."13 9 Narrative theory, then, provides a strong dynamic
framework for the emotional-rational process. 4 °
I. "Calm Passions"-Why Most of Us Are Not in a Continual State of
Emotional Riot Over Every Event
A reasonably skeptical person might ask, "Are all decisions really
emotional ones, the result of some blending, Russian Dressing-like, of
emotions and reason?" Is it really an emotional process to select an item
from a menu or to decide which movie to rent from the video store?
Does a judge who, from all appearances could not be more bored,
actually decide a dispute over the alleged six-inch encroachment of a
driveway by weighing emotions?
The answer, of course, must be "yes" because each of those projects,
routine as they may be, require the ascribing of meaning. The actor
must choose which item on the menu sounds most appetizing and which
video seems likely to be most entertaining. Even the judge must sift
through a panoply of emotions when ruling on her banal driveway-

will enable the reader to connect the story with a more general rule or principle. True, but
irrelevant-most of us already follow this counsel." Delgado, supra note 23, at 670
(footnotes omitted); see also West, supra note 75, at 108-09; Margulies, supra note 23, at
1110, 1138 (noting that stories lead to critical thinking). Indeed, Baron and Epstein's work
on narrative theory remind us of the major point of this Article: to ask whether narrative
jurisprudence-or any legal theory-wrongly employs recourse to emotion or forsakes
rationality confounds the actuality of the emotional-rational process. Barron & Epstein,
supra note 133, at 145-46.
139. Nussbaum, supra note 25, at 24; see also DE SOUSA, supra note 25, at 157 (using
roleplaying in psychotherapy to illustrate that one can believe but cannot experience the
emotional-rational process of others without attempting to feel, or "role play," the
perspective of the observed party).
140. In light of political reality, a role many narrative theorists have appointed for their
theory is to provide effective voices for "outsiders," that is, to introduce counter-narratives
to offset the dominating narratives that inform law. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 23, at
670-71; Margulies, supra note 23, at 1112. Much narrative jurisprudence attacks the
status quo, arguing the familiar but critical point that the prevailing law is not based on
proven transcendent truths, but politics and power. Thus, the political agenda of many
theorists is to change hearts and minds in the hope of replacing one power structure-one
set of narrative and paradigm scenarios-with another. See, e.g., Richard Delgado,
Rodrigo'sBook Of Manners: How To ConductA ConversationOn Race-Standing,Imperial
Scholarship,And Beyond, 86 GEO. L.J. 1051, 1056 (1998); West, supra note 75, at 107-08;
Bandes, supra note 17, at 375-78, 409.
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boundary case to discern which party's claim best conforms with the law.
She must overcome boredom and try to determine the facts, if any are
in dispute, or if there is a question of witness veracity. The drivewayencroachment case may not carry the same drama as a multiple
homicide, but even the application of a set of laws to simple facts
requires the judge to ascribe meaning, or significance, to some facts over
others and to reaffirm, albeit very briefly, that her understanding of the
applicable law, in her estimation, is correct. To do so, she must engage
the emotional-rational process although probably in low gear.
While the emotional process is dynamic, it cannot be maintained fullblast every waking moment. People are not in a constant state of
emotional turmoil when responding to every possible stimulus. Hume
understood that once we adopt emotional-rational responses, we apply
them routinely, often unconsciously, generating little emotional energy.
These responses Hume called "calm passions." To apply some modern
terminology, calm passions are those paradigm scenarios we have
embraced and with which we are so comfortable that, when the situation
arises, we apply the scenario's mandate with little or no conscious
agitation nor troubling reflection. We have turned something that once
was problematic into something no longer troubling."'
The importance of calm passions cannot be overstated because, as
Hume understood, most of our habits, beliefs, and patterns of action are
ensconced as calm passions. In this regard, calm passions ought not be
confused with weak passions. Calm passions may be weak, but in many
instances they are quite strong, that is, passions of great consequence to
the particular actor.'
Indeed, by adulthood the majority of our most
deeply cherished opinions and prejudices often drowse as calm passions,

141. Hume described the calm passions as follows:
Now it is certain, there are certain calm desires and tendencies, which, though
they be real passions, produce little emotion in the mind, and are more known by
their effects than by the immediate feeling or sensation ....

[Wihen a passion

has once become a settled principle of action, and is the predominant inclination
of the soul, it commonly produces no longer any sensible agitation. As repeated
custom and its own force have made everything yield to it, it directs the actions
and conduct without that opposition and emotion, which so naturally attend every
momentary gust of passion.
HUME, supra note 27, at 158, 159. Oatley reaffirmed Hume's observations two-and-one-half
centuries later: "Consciousness is a small part of mental processing, and may be primarily
concerned with new adaptations, as, for instance, when we construct new plans to deal
with problematic events .... When there is nothing problematic, behavior runs off
automatically." OATLEY, supra note 7, at 34; see also BATES, supra note 39, at 49-50
(concerning the concept of "structural models" adopted by individuals to represent ideas or
other things upon which the individual reflects).
142. See PENELEUM, supra note 5, at 125-26.
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which is why it is so difficult to change long-held convictions; before
convincing the listener that your position is correct, you may have to
irritate the listener by agitating calm passions.'43 Persuading a
reluctant listener often involves arousing calm passions, for we must
overcome recalcitrance by making the listener reconsider familiar,
comfortable, and likely cherished, judgments, opinions, or beliefs.
Awakening someone's calm passions is apt to induce anger because the
awakening forces the actor to reconsider matters that she had deemed
concluded. Thus, the very process of animating reconsideration is rageinducing because the listener must now spend time and effort rethinking
something she thought required no re-examination.
More than that, if the calm passion is precious, as usually is the case
in political, moral, and legal arguments, the listener likely adopted the
underlying paradigm scenario as part of her self-definition, that is, as
integral to her individuality and sense of self. The process of learning
emotions often requires expending considerable effort and costs in terms
of time, intellectual energy, and, of course, emotions. The reasons why
emotional patterns are difficult to change, then, are no mystery. After
indulging the delay and trouble to choose among competing paradigm
scenarios, actors do not wish to reinvent themselves substantially on a
routine basis by revisiting and re-evaluating learned emotions and
attendant patterns of behavior. This incessant relearning of integral
comportment would be too much trouble and too disruptive because we
rely on paradigm scenarios to provide deft and reliable instructions for
how to react in given situations. Each actor's repertoire of paradigm
scenarios renders a convenient and tested bundle of behaviors or
behavior choices in response to particular conditions. They become
essential to each actor's conception of self, defining the given actor as an
individual apart and distinct from others.
Indeed, often the resolve of a calm passion becomes even more
unrelenting because the given actor may be so satisfied with and reliant
upon a calm passion that she misconstrues it for objective verity rather
than personal truth. "When any of these passions are calm, and cause
no disorder in the soul, they are very readily taken for the determination

143.

See, e.g., NUSSBAUM, supra note 7, at 61 (explaining that emotions are concerned

not only with feelings but with "certain beliefs about their objects ....

Some of the beliefs

in question, especially those concerned with value or importance, may be very deeply
rooted in one's psychology; getting rid of them cannot be expected to be the job of a one-

shot argument. But without these beliefs, no emotion can take root.").
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of reason, and are supposed to proceed from the same faculty, with that,
which judges truth and falsehood."'
To reconsider paradigm scenarios on a constant basis, therefore, is not
simply inefficient; it would challenge the ability of actors to retain senses
of themselves-identities to distinguish themselves from a world of
others. 45 The excitation of the calm passion challenges their judgment
and thus their identities. The act of convincing a reluctant listener,
therefore, is doubly hard, for not only must one overcome the opposing
paradigm scenario, but one must also appease the attendant
exaspera146
tion of the listener whose calm passion is now irritated.
J.

The Rationality of the Emotional-RationalProcess
It is appropriate to conclude this discussion of the emotional-rational
process by noting that, despite the inextricable fusing of emotions and
rationality to attain meaning, some still argue that humanity would be
better off by limiting the role of emotions because emotions purportedly
are the well-spring of irrationality. 47 Regarding the interplay of
reason and emotions, commentators seem fascinated by the question
whether emotions themselves are rational as though an affirmative
answer would better justify the role of emotions in human relations. In
fact, emotions are neither rational nor irrational. Emotions simply are;
they arise from triggers and are modified, augmented, or substituted by
conscious or unconscious reflection of paradigm scenarios. Hume
recognized as much:

144. HUME, supra note 27, at 158; see supra note 141 and infra notes 146, 182-83
(discussing how the legal status quo is misconstrued as inherently rational while
challenges to the prevailing standards often are deemed overtly emotional).
145. See, e.g., NUSSBAUM, supra note 7, at 61-62; HUME, supra note 27, at 158-59.
146. For example, a judge may harbor as a calm passion the belief that gay and lesbian
relationships are wrong. The adoption of the belief might have been accompanied with a
number of very strong emotions, yet because he has made this paradigm scenario into a
calm passion, the judge may be unaware of the emotions initially involved. The judge,
therefore, may wholly misinterpret his extant nonagitated belief in the wrongfulness of
homosexuality as a position adopted exclusively though rational thought without "tainting"
emotions. Understandably, it will be extremely difficult to change this judge's opinion to
embrace a right of privacy covering privately performed acts of homosexual conduct
between consenting adults. To do so, the advocate must challenge, and thereby excite, the
judge's cherished calm passion that homosexuality is immoral. The very act of agitating
that or any calm passion immediately irritates the judge, thus disposing her against the
advocate's plea. Substantially compounding the judge's exasperation are the negative
emotions attendant to changing her position and thus having to admit she was wrong on
an issue of profound importance. An admission like this would be a serious self-reproach
that most people, understandably, are reluctant to make.
147. See, e.g., supra notes 4-21 and accompanying text.
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A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of
existence, and contains not any representative quality, which renders
it a copy of any other existence or modification .... It is impossible,
therefore, that ...passion[s] can be opposed by, or be contradictory to
truth and reason; since this contradiction consists in the disagreement
of ideas, considered as copies, with those objects, which they represent.148

Emotions cannot be right or wrong, good or bad, appropriate or
inappropriate, worthy or corrupt, valuable or worthless; they can neither
be blamed nor congratulated for happening.
Emotions cannot be
branded objectively rational or irrational because emotions are not a
reasoning process. Therefore, to say that an emotion experienced by a
given individual is irrational is as fallacious as asserting that any
fact-any empirically certain thing-is irrational. If John suffers from

an ulcer, we do not say that the ulcer is irrational although, of course,
we might criticize or condone the cause of the ulcer. That John
experiences love likewise does not make the emotion of love irrational.
The love, like the ulcer, exists, and its existence is neither rational nor
irrational; it simply is.149
Although emotions themselves cannot be assessed for rational content,
they are an essential component of a process that fuses emotions and
reason to divine meaning. The ascription of meaning may be judged to
be appropriate or inappropriate. As noted earlier, the prejudice against
emotions doubtless is due in large part because we feel emotions and we
assess the appropriateness of our reasoning process by the emotions
attendant to that process. Because emotions constitute our feelings, we

148. HUME, supra note 27, at 156-57. As De Sousa similarly explained 250 years later:
Since emotions are learned in terms of paradigm scenarios, they cannot, at least
within a given social context, be criticized for inappropriateness if they occur in
response to a relevantly similar situation. Here we must carefully distinguish the
emotion itself from the behavioral response that the scenario might involve: it
does not follow from the rationality of the emotion evoked that the stock response
will continue to be seen as rational. Where the response is an action or strategy,
it needs to be assessed in its own terms. It may be that a further narrowing of
the context is needed before the minimal rationality of the behavior is guaranteed.
DE SOUSA, supra note 25, at 185.
149. Thus, emotions are not irrational insofar as the statement "John is experiencing
emotion X" is true. If verified, the statement corresponds with the state of things: John
is experiencing emotion X. Cf Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation,
58 S. CAL. L. REV. 279, 312 (1985) (discussing the realist approach to the ontology of truth
and the epistemology of correspondence, that is, we know some statement of affairs is
truthful if it corresponds with the way things are); Michael S. Moore, Moral Reality, 1982
WIS. L. REV. 1061, 1109 (1982).
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are apt to blame the emotions for our mistakes rather than understanding that our errors are the results of a poorly operating process in which
reasoning too is at fault.150

Moreover, even if the claim that emotions rather than reason foster
irrationality was actual, there is no better alternative for human
existence. A life without emotions would rob human beings of their very
humanity. De Sousa, among many others, has posited the grotesque
aspect of an actor who acts on rationality alone. Emotions, after all, are
not designed simply for existing in a living state, for "basic survival
functions have no need of emotions at all." 1 ' Rather, emotions are
integral to our humanity; we cannot be good or bad, strong or weak,
worthy or ignoble without emotions: "A truly emotionless being would
be either some kind of Kantian monster with a computer brain and a
pure rational will, or else a Cartesian animal-machine, an ant, perhaps,
in which every 'want' is preprogrammed and every 'belief' simply a
releasing cue for a specific response."" 2 Both the ant and the Kantian
monster have in common "complete determinacy: in the first by
mechanism, in the second by reason."5 3 A life of rationality without
emotion would render human beings ambulating ledger pages-living
lists of logical formulae, absent personality, existing for no apparent
reason, and unable to derive significance from either themselves or
others. Thus, even if emotions could be irrational, it is better to cope
with and attempt to correct discrete instances of emotional irrationality
than to limit the role of emotions in the emotional-rational process.
Much of the criticism of emotions stems from the belief that emotions
are not manageable or are very difficult to self-govern while reason is
the triumph of calculation and self-control. One core of this argument
is that emotions arise unbidden, perhaps unwanted. Professor Pillsbury
opined:
[Tihe rationality of emotions operates at a different level than ordinary
deliberative thought processes. Emotions are normally prereflective.
Their cognitive assessment is normally made without conscious,
150. In the context of a social situation concerning moral judgments, if John respects
a selfish, evil hypocrite who cares nothing for humanity, it is not the respect that is
objectively irrational; rather, if irrationality exists, it is the emotional-reasoning process
that led John to break the rules of a paradigm scenario, which directs that, to earn respect,
people should do good acts and be honest. As an unfortunate shorthand, we are apt to say,
"John's respect for that selfish, evil hypocrite is irrational," thus blaming the emotion when
the fault lies with the emotional-rational process. Rather, we should say, "John's analysis
leading to embracing the emotion of respect was irrational."
151. DE SOUSA, supra note 25, at 190.
152. Id. at 190-91.
153. Pillsbury, supra note 16, at 680.
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deliberate effort. They may depend on cognitive sources of which the
conscious mind is not otherwise aware. The suddenness of the
[emotional] experience, its strength, and the lack of a deliberative
trigger lead to the assumption that the emotion is a nonrational force
that happens to US.154
Professor Pillsbury is correct, as we have seen, that the first felt
emotion in a given emotional-rational episode arises unexpectedly from
some triggering event;155 however, he incorrectly concluded that the
process of considering emotions is different from other rational processes.
If emotions often spring abruptly, no less do concepts, ideas, and
thoughts. If I walk down the street and chance upon my friend Jane, I
no more consciously choose to reason that I unexpectedly am seeing Jane
than I consciously choose to experience whatever emotions are attendant
to seeing Jane. The ideas "That is Jane I am seeing" and "Jane is my
friend" come to my consciousness as spontaneously as emotions such as
joy ("I am happy to see her"). I did not elect to recognize Jane, nor did
I choose to be happy to see her. The process that allowed me to
recognize Jane from the world of all other persons and to recognize the
emotion of joy were both "prereflective."
It is true that even when embedded in our consciousness, undeniably
it is very difficult in many cases to control, modify, and manage
emotions. It is difficult but surely not impossible. Experience confirms
what the earlier discussion of philosophy and psychology
grasped-people learn to control and even to choose emotional responses."M Moreover, if we do not always master emotions, neither do we
Through innate intelligence, experience, and
master reason. 5 7
education, we learn logic and the art of analogy just as we learn to
recognize, interpret, and act in response to our emotions;' 5 8 most
importantly, we combine this knowledge into the emotional-rational

154. Id. at 679 (footnotes omitted); see also Sabini & Silver, supra note 9, at 169 ("A
central notion of our moral lives is responsibility, and responsibility presupposes choice;
emotion is unchosen .... To be sure, we sometimes are responsible for controlling the
expression of these mental states, but we are not typically seen as responsible for having
them in the first place.").
155. See supra Part II.H.1.
156. See supra Parts II.E, F.
157. "Some emotions can be unreliable, just as reason can be .... Emotions, like
reasons, can lead in multiple directions and create problems of indeterminacy .... All of
this means that emotional responses must be openly tested by deliberation and reasoned
examination, and vice-verse." Gewirtz, supra note 11, at 1036 (footnotes omitted). In other
words, the unreliable or inadequate response, conclusion, or mode of behavior results from
the emotional-rational process, not from reason or emotions suspended from the process.
158. See, e.g., DE SOUSA, supra note 25, at 188.
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melding. In any societal grouping, some people reason better than
others, just as some seem more adept at controlling and balancing their
passions.159

Some commentators insist that emotions are irrational or that they act
as obstacles to reason because emotions can distort facts. A hypothetical

situation by Professor Pillsbury illustrates why the claim that emotions
distort facts is itself irrational:
Emotive cognitions may make sense in terms of the world view they
presuppose, but not necessarily in terms of reflective rationality. A
person may live in terror of ants, believing that even a single one may
devour him. This belief does not comport with reality; it is irrational.
But given this belief, fear provoked by the sight of an ant is entirely
rational. It is the cognitive assessment which is mistaken."6
Asserting that emotions distort facts, therefore, is prattle. What is
called a factual distortion by emotion is a matter of conflicting interpretations of an actor and her observers. It may be that the observers are
able to compel upon the actor a behavior change. The influence of the
observers upon the actor evinces either the observers' ability to convince
the actor to re-enter the emotional-rational process and to adopt a new
interpretation, or reveals the observers' coercive power, or both.
If emotions cannot be said to distort facts, often they stand accused of
distorting reason itself.'
Professor Hill presents the exemplar of this
position by asserting that emotions can influence beliefs,' 62 affect
values, 1' 3 and "may disorganize the very process of reasoning it-

159. Commenting on how reason is as subject to abuse and mistake as are so-called
emotional appeals through narrative, Professors Baron and Epstein noted, "We do not
dismiss statistics as evidence because they are sometimes unreliable or inaccessible, and
we need not dismiss stories on those grounds either. Reliability, accessibility, relevance,
persuasiveness all go to the quality of the evidence, not to whether something can be
evidence." Baron & Epstein, supra note 133, at 180.
160. Pillsbury, supra note 16, at 680.
161. Generally explaining the position that emotions distort reasoning, Professor Frost
recounted:
Even though classical rhetoricians preferred appeals to reason, they recognized the
powerful persuasive effect of appeals to emotion. Even so, they disapproved of
appeals to emotion because emotion impairs the audience's ability to reach a wellreasoned decision. While modern experts also recognize that emotion may impair
the audience's ability to reason logically, they are more tolerant of nonrational
"reasoning" than their predecessors.
Frost, supra note 121, at 111.
162. "[Ilntense desires may have easily discernible influences upon an individual's
beliefs which, in turn, will affect the capacity for rational judgment." Hill, supra note 9,
at 675 (emphasis added).
163. Id. at 677.
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The response is to reiterate that (1) it is the emotionalself.""
rational process that is infirm, not the emotion itself, and (2) even if
emotions can distort the emotional-rational process, so too can reasoning
itself.
The emotional-rational process invariably is subjectively rational.'6 5
Furthermore, the emotional-rational process is always objectively
rational except when the actor chooses a course of action despite an
empirically verifiable fact' that the actor knows will frustrate the
attainment of the relevant goal. Again, Hume put it best, explaining
why passions cannot be irrational:
[A]s nothing can be contrary to truth or reason, except what has a
reference to it, and as the judgements of our understanding only have
this reference, it must follow, that passions can be contrary to reason
only so far as they are accompanied with some judgement or opinion.
According to this principle, which is so obvious and natural, it is only
in two senses, that any affection can be called unreasonable. First,
when a passion, such as hope or fear, grief or joy, despair or security,
is founded on the supposition of the existence of objects, which really
do not exist. Secondly, when in exerting any passion in action, we
choose means insufficient for the design'd end, and deceive ourselves
in our judgement of causes and effects. Where a passion is neither
founded on false suppositions, nor chooses means insufficient for the
end, the understanding can neither justify nor condemn it.'
This Article avers that there are only two reasons an emotional-rational
episode is objectively irrational: (1) the actor is incapacitated, or (2) she
cheated.
Incapacity is a physiological or psychological inability to perform
minimally logical analysis in a given instance; therefore, even when

164. Id. at 678 (citing KEITH OATLEY, Do Emotional States Produce Irrational
Thinking?, in LINES OF THINKING: REFLECTIONS ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THOUGHT (K.J.

Gilhooly et al. eds. 1990)); see also Hill, supra note 9, at 688-89 ("Emotional disturbances
may affect the capacity to reason practically in several ways, including intrapsychic
coercion and compulsion, and social conditioning. Their influence skews the deliberative
process.").
Professor Hill opined that "exploitation is the knowing manipulation of these processes,"
that is, exploiting and affecting "strong emotional and affective states [to] impede sound
reasoning." This exploitation leads to full or partial exculpation for the affected actor
because "the obviously debilitating effects of these processes should excuse certain
behavior, at least when another takes advantage of these all-too-human frailties in the
deliberative process." Hill, supra note 9, at 678-79 (footnote omitted).
165. See supra Part II.C.
166. For the purposes of this Article, "empirically verifiable" will encompass logically
verifiable, such as mathematics.
167. HUME, supra note 27, at 157 (emphasis added).
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made aware of a salient fact, the actor is unable to change his emotional
For instance, a judge is incapacitated if she grants
response."
judgment to a defendant even though she believes the plaintiff fully
proved his case. As a reality, she should not have granted judgment for
the defendant, but for some reason, the judge cannot comprehend that
what she is doing is contrary to her true wishes. Her incapacity makes
her do something that is antithetical to what she really wants.
The second mode of objective irrationality is cheating. When actors lie
or cheat, we might say that they choose to act objectively irrationally
although certainly not subjectively irrationally. A judge may falsely
claim to find a given witness not credible and thus render a verdict that
fits the judge's fancy but that the judge knows is contrary to the
evidence. Cheating, however, requires a functioning emotional-rational
process wherein reasoning and emotion are co-conspirators. Emotions
alone cannot lead to such objective irrationality.'6 9
III.

THE USEFULNESS OF THE "RUSSIAN DRESSING" THEORY

The Difficult Conception of an Emotional-RationalProcess
This Article has demonstrated that emotions cannot be separated from
human intercourse and that we ought not try to do so, especially in
projects of great meaning and significance such as legal decision making.
More particularly, to generate meaning, the human intellect does not
simply utilize reason and emotion-the two do not remain separate
entities although intertwined. Rather, intellect can only devise meaning
by a systemic fusing of emotion and reason. We have seen, as well, that
a legal, political, or ethical stance purported to be the product of
detached, unemotional reason is nothing of the sort. Rather, any stance,
position, or standard of this sort reflects the emotional-rational fusing
employed by the given law or policy makers.

A.

168. DE SOUSA, supra note 25, at 122. Interestingly, and completely plausibly, De
Sousa believes that incapacity is not irrational. For De Sousa, "rationality applies only to
[Tihere are responses before there are intentional states, but there
intentional states ....
are no scenarios, and therefore no emotions, until those responses can be integrated into
an intentional structure, enabling the [actor] to understand the meaning of different
possible roles." Id. at 186.
169. Thus, contrary to Hume's implication, mistake is not necessarily irrational. For
example, if Jane mistakenly thinks she sees her beau embracing Jane's rival, she may be
jealous and angry, a reasonable emotional-rational response. When she learns her beau
was giving a fraternal hug to his sister, Jane should no longer be jealous. The mistake
lead to "rational"emotions but, arguably, it would be "irrational" for Jane to be angry once
the mistake is corrected. If she does not change her emotions, Jane either is incapacitated

(unable to understand the facts) or she is cheating.
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Remarkably, even the most ardent adherents to the importance of
emotions have trouble conceptualizing a true melding process. Like the
commentators they criticize, emotion theorists are apt to neglect the
dynamic of the emotional-rational process, denoting policies and
positions with which they disagree as too emotional or lacking in reason
while lauding their favored stances as reason incarnate.
Consider, for example, an earlier quoted proposition from Professor
Pillsbury's article on emotions:
In recent years cognitive theories of emotion have dominated both the
philosophical and the psychological literature on the subject. Cognitive
theories come in many varieties, but all share the idea that cognition
is central to emotion. By cognition I mean a perception which we can
determine to be correct or incorrect according to rational principles. A
cognitive approach holds that emotion is a cognitive assessment of a
person or situation, which assessment is associated with a physiological
sensation, normally accompanied by a desire to undertake a particular
kind of action.'7
At first blush the quote above seems to express the emotional-rational
process; however, closer inspection reveals that if "cognitive" means "a
perception which [is] correct or incorrect according to rational principles," then, in fact, Professor Pillsbury's formulation is as follows: "A
cognitive approach holds that emotion is a [rationally correct or incorrect
perception] assess[ed] of a person or situation, which assessment is
associated with a physiological sensation, normally accompanied by a
desire to undertake a particular kind of action." But an emotion is not
a "rationally correct or incorrect perception" any more than rationality
is an emotionally correct or incorrect perception. Decision making is the
melding of emotion and reason, the outcome of which will be rational or
irrational due to the process of melding, not due to the component
emotions. Perhaps unintentionally, Professor Pillsbury's formulation
subordinates emotions to reason; indeed, it seems to make emotions a
specie of reason. By so doing, the formulation implies that reason is
better than emotion and hints that emotion, although not to be
eliminated, is merely a functionary of reason. The advancement of
reason over emotion confuses the reality of the emotional-rational
process, exalts reason as superior, and thus threatens to impair decision
making.
Professor Pillsbury's misapprehension is exemplified in his discussion
of sentencing in capital crimes: "Because of the magnitude of the capital
decision, its complexity, and the degree of discretion enjoyed by

170.

Pillsbury, supra note 16, at 675 (footnotes omitted).
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sentencers, sentencing decisions are likely to be emotional as well as
rational."17 ' No, the sentencers' decisions are the result of the emotional-rational process. They are not "emotional as well as rational."
Rather, the decisions are the confluence of emotions and reason.
Another example is found in Professor Susan Bandes' powerful work,
Empathy, Narrative And Victim Impact Statements, v2 which makes a
compelling case against the use of victim-impact statements at the
sentencing of convicted felons. Bandes commenced her work by carefully
outlining the dynamics of the emotional-rational process' with an
emphasis on the emotions related to empathy.'74 With the foregoing
prelude, Professor Bandes urged that victims' impact statements should
be barred as evidence at criminal sentencing because (1) they diminish
rather than enhance the dignity of the victim and (2) they unduly
jury from appropriate empathy, if not compassion, for the
obstruct the175
perpetrator.

Her argument is powerful, but to cement her point, Professor Bandes
attempted to separate emotions from reasoning. That approach simply
will not do, even in the realm of criminal sentencing where, to borrow
Hume's phrase, emotions are "lively." Specifically, Professor Bandes
capped her rationale with the following:
[T]he problem with victim impact statements is not that they evoke
emotion rather than reason. Rather, it is that they evoke unreasoned,
unreflective emotion that cannot be placed in any useable perspective.

171. Id. at 697 (footnote omitted).
172. Bandes, supra note 17.
173. Id. at 366-72.
174. Id. at 373-82.
175. Id. at 392-410. According to Bandes, jurors are more likely to identify with and
feel sympathy for the victim and the victim's survivors than to empathize with the
perpetrator, especially when the victim is a member of the community from which the jury
is drawn. Jurors' paradigm scenarios thus incline them towards the victim. Id. at 399-400.
Victim impact statements are apt to dissuade consideration of both the defendant's actual
moral culpability and any mitigating circumstances by distracting the jury with
impassioned testimony about the pain and suffering endured by the crime victims for
whom the jury already harbors imbalanced favor.
Moreover, impact statements "cheapen" the lives of some victims in favor of others. For
instance, the victim who leaves a grieving family behind is deemed more worthy and a
greater loss to society than a victim without survivors. Thus, a felon is more likely to
suffer maximum punishment because, by chance, her victim was married or had children
than if her victim was a misanthrope. Bandes believes that this sort of standard devalues
human life by allowing a criminal to procure a lighter penalty by selecting, deliberately or
fortuitously, a less socially valuable victim. For these and similar reasons, Bandes argued
that victims' impact statements should be prohibited from use at trial as too prejudicial.
Id. at 395-410.
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In evidentiary terms, victim impact statements are prejudicial and
inflammatory. They overwhelm the [jury's] ability to process other
relevant evidence, such as evidence of mitigation ....
[A victim
impact statement] interferes with-and indeed may completely
block-the jury's ability to empathize with the defendant or comprehend his humanity. 76'
Professor Bandes blames emotions-the bad emotions from the victimimpact statement that block reason, that is, reason as formulated in an
empathic response towards the defendant. Professor Bandes may be
right that victim-impact statements are "prejudicial and inflammatory"
to the point that they should not be admissible in court; however, the
fault of impact statements, if fault exists, arises not from emotions, but
from the emotional-rational process-the paradigm scenarios-attendant
to the statements.
It is true that a victim-impact statement may incite feelings such as
sympathy for the victim, rage, and a wish for vengeance against the
perpetrator. Doubtless, those may trump other feelings that might
moderate fury with the defendant. However, such physio-psychological
feelings, which we identify as emotions, did not spring full-blown from
some genetic or biological determinism. The feelings are part of received
paradigm scenarios-an amalgam of emotions and reason-which,
rightly or wrongly, instruct us to be angry with and seek to punish
severely perpetrators of certain crimes because of the pain they cause.
Perhaps victim-impact statements may reflect unworthy paradigm
scenarios favoring victims over violators, especially when the defendant
comes from outside the community of the victim and jury. Conceivably,
these statements promote arguably unethical prejudices based on
cultural stereotypes. To say, however, that the problem with victimimpact statements is their emotional content is as wrong as asserting
that appreciating the perpetrator's account is a matter of emotionless
rationality.177

176. Id. at 401-02 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
177. Accordingly, if a jury considers the victim-impact statement and, through
deliberation, rejects the defendant's story, the rejection of the defendant may be morally
suspect but not the product of passion alone. Rather, the jury employed an emotionalrational process that placed a higher value on the paradigm scenarios of the victim than
of her victimizer. Indeed, even if a hypothetical jury was totally maddened by the victimimpact statement and gave not the slightest consideration to the defendant's pleas, the jury
would not be driven by unaccompanied emotion, but by the paradigm scenario adopted by
the jurors preferring the victim and disavowing the defendant. The adoption of that
paradigm scenario was a product of social learning, and its adoption required reason and
reflection. Perhaps the paradigm scenario now is a calm passion; that is, although offered
the defendant's testimony and instructed by the judge to consider that testimony, the jury
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Similarly, other theorists cannot resist separating emotion from reason

within the decision making process. Professor Nussbaum proposed in
Love's Knowledge, "Frequently, it will be [an actor's] passionate response,
rather than detached thinking, that will guide her to the appropriate
recognitions. Intellect will often want to consult these feelings to get
information about the true nature of the situation." 7 ' Granted, the
beginning of any emotional-rational episode is a triggering event, but
that trigger promotes unbidden ideas as well as emotions. Intellect, we
have learned, does not "want" to consult emotions any more than
emotions "want" to consult intellect. Rather, intellect and emotions must
interact in a systemic process through which meaning and significance
are adduced by the given actor. Once again, it must be emphasized the
understandable, accustomed habit of separating emotion and reason
confuses how people reflect.
Even Hume, the fountainhead of modern emotions theory, misconceived the interplay of emotions and reason. Based on his conclusion
that abstract rationality always lacks meaning in human lives, Hume
wrote one of the most controversial supposition regarding emotions and
rationality in the history of ideas: "We speak not strictly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and reason. Reason is, and
ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any
other office than to serve and obey them." 7 9
This supposition has led to a prevalent shorthand for Hume's position:
Emotions tell you what you want; reason tells you how to get what you
want.8 ° Penelhum offered the following summary:
Reason shows us how to satisfy our desires, and in enabling us to

recognize that which we then come to want, it can even prompt them,
although [Hume] does not concede this explicitly. What reason cannot
do is motivate us of itself. It is the slave of the passions. But there are
many things we can do with the help of a slave that we could not do if
we did not have one, and for all the air of paradox with which Hume
pronounces his theories, he does not deny this.'

is unwilling to reconsider the paradigm scenario favoring the victim. In that case, while
embracing a victim impact statement is an exercise of a calm passion, the underlying
paradigm scenario is no less the product of reason with emotion.
178. NUSSBAUM, supra note 5, at 79 (emphasis added).
179.

HUME, supra note 27, at 156.

180. As Professor Hill explained, "[According to Hume, reason can never give us
knowledge of ultimate ends but has only an instrumental role in telling us how to achieve
what we already value." Hill, supra note 9, at 673 n.248.
181. PENELHUM, supra note 5, at 129; see also RACHEL M. KIDD, REASON AND CONDUCT
IN HUME'S TREATISE ch. 5 (Oxford 1964).
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Whether Hume was purposefully exaggerating or not, clearly emotions
and reason are essential parts of the same project, selecting goals and
modes of behavior in given situations. Ascribing a metaphorical
supremacy of one over the other within the process itself, is evocative
but, as we now know, deceiving.182
This is no small point. Inability or unwillingness to understand the
systemic merging of emotions and reason means that a decision maker
can never be certain that she has made what she truly should feel is the
correct decision in a specific situation. By attempting to exclude or
diminish the flow of emotions, the decision maker distorts her ability to
perceive, thereby substantially limiting both her choice of possible
meanings and the depth of those meanings she decides to weigh. With
her perception thus impaired, her comprehension of the given problem
and her sagacity are debilitated. The moment she thinks to herself, "I
am getting emotional. I am not being rational. Thus, the meaning I am
contemplating must be wrong," she has rebuffed what might be the best
meaning or what, upon reflection, might have led to some other, better
meaning upon which to resolve the given problem.
A second related and more insidious fallacy attends the misconceived
distinction between emotions and rationality. It is easy, tempting, and
incorrect to state, "The position I adopt is rational; the position you
espouse is emotional." It appeals to the prevailing prejudice that things
rational are transcendent and correct but things emotional are fleeting
and problematic. Thus, one singularly serious danger of failing to
appreciate the actuality of the emotional-rational process is that decision
makers and commentators misperceive how decisions, legal and

182. See, e.g., DAMASIO, DEscARTES' ERROR, supra note 79, at 246 ("Knowing about the
relevance of feelings in the processes of reason does not suggest that reason is less
important than feelings, that it should take a backseat to them or that it should be less
cultivated.") (emphasis added). As Bates explicated regarding thought and action,
[Ilt is important to be clear in pointing out that it is not assumed that cognitive
action is being thought of as the master and behavior the slave. To do so would
impose a "rationalistic" orientation, because such an assumption would lead to the
conclusion that thought or cognition always precedes and controls action, as the
orders of a master precede the actions of the slave. Thought, as a behavioral
process, is regarded here as one that may as easily be provoked by overt action as
to think of overt action as being provoked by thought. Without such an
assumption, perception as a process could not operate to allow an organism to
adapt to an environment outside itself. The process of perception must be
conceived of in such a way that although ending in a cognitive process of meaning
attribution, it begins with the events and objects outside the organism that elicit
cognition through evoking neural stimulation.
Bates, supra note 39, at 30.
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otherwise, actually are made. Based on their grievous misconception,
decision makers and commentators may fallaciously castigate an actual
or proposed decision as "emotional" rather than "rational." In this way,
the status quo wrongfully is deemed unemotional once in place; that is,
a given meaning or set of meanings formalized as a legal standard or
3
policy becomes the usual, accustomed norm-a calm passion.1
Proponents may declare that the standard's predominance evinces its
rationality, untarnished by emotions, ignorant or defiant of two realities:
(1) the adoption and enforcement of any policy results from the
emotional-rational process, and (2) delineating a standard or policy as
rational rather than emotional is a partisan classification.
One vital project of emotion theory, therefore, is to shake the law
makers from their lethargy that emotion and reason are separable in
decision making endeavors by showing their inextricable interconnectedness-their process nature or phenomenology. Judges need both to
understand and to embrace that they must be emotional to render
judgments, to interpret law, indeed, to fulfill their roles as judges. To
accomplish this goal, we must free ourselves from the vocabulary that
promotes intellectual laziness about emotions and reason. Judges in
particular must believe, perhaps as a calm passion, that for any human
project involving the assessment and imparting of meaning, especially
for projects involving law, one never acts emotionally or rationally; one
acts according to a process in which emotions and reason twist, blend,
and meld.""
B. Maxims For Law Makers To Evoke Based on the Melding of
Emotions and Reason
The point of the foregoing extensive foray into the philosophy and
psychology of emotions has been to augment earlier jurisprudence
applying emotions theory to judicial decision making. It is hoped that
the thorough explication herein, particularly the Russian Dressing
metaphor, will induce legal decision makers, especially reluctant judges,
to recognize that emotions no less than reason must inform their
decision making processes. Once free from the fiction of unimpassioned
decision rendering, judges may be more knowledgeable of their decisionmaking operations and, therefore, be as forthright and self-aware as

183. See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 17, at 370, 385, 409; see also Delgado, supra note 23,
at 666-67; Margulies, supra note 23, at 1126; Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 296-97;
HUME, supra note 27, at 158.
184. As Professor Gewirtz noted, "The answer is to insist upon the dialectic of emotion
and reason, feeling and deliberation, story and theory, rhetoric and argument." Gewirtz,

supra note 11, at 1035.
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possible. I join the myriad of commentators who hope that, with
increased self-knowledge, judges will become more broad-minded,
empathetic, and compassionate.
Given the importance of emotions in the reflective process and in light
of the persistent hostility towards emotions from the bench and bar, this
Article ends with proposed maxims that, I think, would go well in any
judges bench-book.
Maxim 1-Each Of Us Is Alone: We have seen that, although we
share ideas via communication, each of our emotional-rational responses,
to some degree, is unique. In this fashion, each of us is alone, attempting to create meaning in our lives by contacting others. The question
becomes, how should actors respond to their lonely existence? Certainly,
one response is that the very isolation of existence justifies whatever
action the lonely actor takes towards any other societal actor. The
solitude of the actor, one might assert, means that no one but the actor
can understand what the actor feels, what she needs, what causes harm,
and what brings pleasure. Morality, then, is purely relative to the actor.
If a second societal actor stops the first actor from completing a given act
or punishes the first actor for acting, it was power, not morality, that
allowed the second actor to prevail.
An altogether different and better lesson is offered by the theorists
discussed in this Article. From the isolation of personal existence, as
noted above, comes a desire to interact, to adopt a consciousness by our
association with others. Our desperate struggle to interact through
sharing emotional-rational scenarios, that is, our hope to pierce our
isolation, should humble us. I join the many commentators who
admonish that the humility of loneliness must tend our thinking towards
empathy, tolerance, understanding, and compassion.
[E]mpathic understanding of and sensitivity to the context in which
differently situated others find themselves is but one aspect of a truly
caring relationship with those others, even if the relationship is as
fleeting and bureaucratized as judge-litigant. Empathic understanding
is therefore essential to any moral response to that person's situation,
including responses prompted by legalism. When we care about the
"differences" of others ... we do so because we are moved to lessen
their burden, not just understand it. 8 '
This Article embraces the growing voices exhorting legal decision
makers, particularly judges, to understand that the inherent solitude of
each individual means that, before passing judgment, the judge must

185.

West, supra note 75, at 106 (footnote omitted).
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recognize and evaluate prejudices, must re-evaluate her calm passions,
and must be not simply willing, but desirous, to hear outsider voices.'
In light of the foregoing, Maxim 1 for judges proposes the following:
I understand that, to a substantial degree, I create the reality through
which I interpret and judge. I understand that all other individuals do
the same. We communicate as best we can and try to see the world as
others see it. We form groups and structures that comprise systems in
order to share and to communicate perceptions, and often our communications are reasonably accurate. However, I must never forget that each
of us constructs our own reality.
Corollary 1: I must try to understand and appreciate the reality of
others, particularly those whose reality is unusual to me. I must
remember that they are melancholy, that is, in great measure alone, as
am I.
or
Corollary 2: I cannot presume that my reality is transcendent
18 7
ontologically correct. I can never be sure I have found the truth.
Maxim 2-Emotions Are Integral To Meaning And Significance:
I understand and accept that the route to meaning-how I evaluate and
judge myself and others-is a reflective, systemic process that requires
not only canons of rationality but also emotion. I know that the
emotional-rational process is like Russian Dressing, a merging and
blending of emotion and reason. This process is how I, along with all
others, make decisions, and I will not resist it or pretend otherwise. I
fully accept that without emotions I cannot make decisions. I must be
aware of the emotions I want to use to make decisions, and I must be
open to the emotions that others would have me consider.
Maxim 3-Paradigm Scenarios and Narrative: I have learned to
organize the fruits of emotional-rational episodes as paradigm scenarios.
These scenarios were taught to me by various societal groups and
individuals such as family, schools, friends, religious and secular
organizations, government, and the like. In large part, these scenarios

186.
[Glood legal judgment is increasingly being seen as Aristotle sees it-as the wise
supplementing of the generalities of written law by a judge who imagines what a
person of practical wisdom would say in the situation, bringing to the business of
judging the resources of a rich and responsive personality ... a vigorous sense of
concrete human reality and ... [a] passionate engagement with life.
NUSSBAUM, supra note 5, at 100-01 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Presumably,
although not necessarily, the judge will be more empathic, compassionate, and wise than

a judge who deceives herself that dispassionate rationalism is obtainable and desirable.
187. See, e.g., Riga, supra note 23, at 71, 73-74.
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were imparted as stories or collections of stories called narratives, and
evaluating facts and legal principles in each case, I use narratives and
reflection to (1) adopt new scenarios; (2) modify, amend, or expand old
scenarios; (3) attempt to harmonize conflicting scenarios; (4) reject
formerly held scenarios when appropriate; and (5) apply the scenarios to
discrete situations.
Corollary 1: The scenarios I have been taught reflect the political and
moral dispositions of those who taught me the scenarios. I can never be
sure those scenarios reflect ontological truth.
Corollary2: My teachers may have used coercive tactics to induce me
to accept given scenarios. How certain am I that I chose to embrace any
scenario I am inclined to apply?
Maxim 4--Question The Status Quo: The status quo does not
represent reason predominating over emotion, nor does an appeal for
change reflect an attempt to overpower rationality with emotion. No less
than any others, the paradigm scenarios constituting the status quo
comprise the Russian Dressing of numerous emotional-rational episodes.
The status quo is the prevailing distribution of power, and its predominance does not necessarily mean that it is just.
Maxim 5-Calm Passions: What I take to be a fact or what I take
to be the truth is a calm passion. I have adopted numerous paradigm
scenarios, including their underlying moral precepts, and have made
them calm passions. These positions are not exemplars of rationality
but, rather, are "calm" because I am so comfortable with the given
scenarios that thinking about them does not agitate me. I must
remember that underlying each calm passion is the Russian Dressing of
an emotional-rational process.
Similarly, the status quo reflects the predominating calm passions of
those able to impose their will. These calm passions may be worthy of
enforcement, but not simply because they are calm passions.
Corollary 1: I understand that I likely will become irritated if my
calm passions are challenged, prompting me to re-evaluate them. Thus,
to test the integrity of any decision I make, I must put aside any anger
I may experience if a party seeks to arouse my calm passions. Indeed,
if a party does not do it for me, I should seek to awaken applicable calm
passions to be sure that, should I use them to make my decision, I do so
because I believe in them, not simply because it is comfortable.
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Maxim 6-Opinions Are Opinions: My published decisions are
called "opinions" because that is what they are. 8 ' They have the force
of law because somebody must make an enforceable decision. An honest
search for truth, then, mandates that the investigator-such as the
judge-"see other than what we see,.. . know other than what we know,
... hear other than what we hear,.. . live other than what we live...
understand other than what we understand."" 9
Maxim 7-Outsider Voice Must Be Heard And Regarded
Seriously Considered: In light of the foregoing maxims, I must be
particularly willing to hear, to understand, and to judge fairly the
positions of those who come from the "outside," that is, outside of my
calm passions. To do so, I should act as though the burden of persuasion
always rests with the party consistent with the status quo, consistent
with my calm passions, or both.
Corollary 1: Before making any decision, I should presume I am
wrong and re-evaluate my decision.
Corollary 2: I must be humble, 190 generous, compassionate, receptive, and worthy of the responsibility of judging others.
Maxim 8-All Who Come Before Me Come In Equal Dignity: As
a judge who understands the integral truth that I cannot escape my
emotions into a realm of transcendent reason, I recognize that:
Therefore, there is a radical equality between persons when they speak
or seek the truth. The standard that measures their relationship is not
stature or power or wealth or education or social work or religion or
creed or race or sex, but truth alone. It is here that we encounter the
very heart of what any authentic and legitimate judicial and legal
system is all about. That is why we can say as the U.S. Supreme Court
says on the entrance to its building, "Equality before the law." We are
not equal in talent or intelligence or personality-only in human
dignity in together seeking the truth. 9 '

188. I should follow Professor Gewirtz's advice: "We should encourage judges to believe
and say: This is the best I can do now; it doesn't solve all the problems, but it's a start,
and I'll keep thinking." Gewirtz, supra note 11, at 1027.
189. Riga, supra note 23, at 75.
190. I adopt the judicial stance that I "[am] not the sole repository of ... truth."
Gewirtz, supra note 11, at 1034.
191. Riga, supra note 23, at 76.

